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I. INTRODUCTION 
Access to medical care is an issue of acute and increasing impor-
tance in the United States, a country in which the most promising of 
ground-breaking technologies may be available to only the privileged 
few. Although debate about the problem of unequal access to medical 
care typically centers on financial obstacles to advanced therapies and 
the obvious inequity of allowing patients' ability to pay to drive treat-
ment decisions, issues of equitable access for patients of both genders 
and all racial and ethnic backgrounds increasingly have come into 
focus. 
These concerns about equitable access animate the ongoing debate 
about how government should regulate the transplantation of kidneys. 
More than 100,000 people in the United States suffer from kidney fail-
ure- what doctors call "end-stage renal disease" (ESRD).1 While kid-
ney failure may be treated with dialysis, 2 kidney transplantation is the 
preferred treatment: studies show that transplant recipients are more 
likely to return to work, avoid hospitalization, and enjoy a greater sense 
1. U.S. Renal Data System (USRDS), 1990 Annual Data Report. 
2. Dialysis mechanically purifies a patient's blood. The patient must remain attached to a 
d ialysis machine three times a week for treatments that might take three to four hours each. 
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of well-being than patients on dialysis.' Kidney transplants constitute 
more than three-fourths of the solid organ transplants performed in 
this country and have success rates routinely as high as eighty percent:' 
A severe shortage of transplantable kidneys, however, limits the availa-
bility of this preferred treatment.6 For example, in 1990, while more 
than 18,000 Americans were registered on waiting lists, fewer than 8200 
received renal transplants.' 
Federal regulations control the allocation of scarce donated kidneys 
among prospective recipients. Since 1972, Medicare has covered the 
costs of virtually all kidney transplants.' To qualify for Medicare reim-
bursement, transplanting hospitals must abide by rules promulgated by 
the federal Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
(OPTN).8 Current OPTN policies for cadaveric kidney allocation give 
strong preference to potential recipients who are genetically similar to 
3. See Roger W. Evans, et al., The Quality of Life of Patients With End-S age Renal Dis-
ease, 312 New Eng. J. Med. 553 (1985); R. J. Fischel, et al., Long-term Outlook for Renal Trans-
plant Recipients with One-year Function, 51 Transplantation 118 (1991); Roger W. Evans, The 
Demand for Transplantation in the United States, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Climcal Transplants 
1990 319 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991). 
4. Paul W. Eggers, Effect of Transplantation on the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease 
Program, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 223 (1988); James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplantation 
Policy: A Time for Reassessment?, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 451, 460 (1989). 
5. Transplantable kidneys come from either "living related" or "cadaveric" donors. In 1990, 
1714 transplants were performed using kidneys from living related donors and 6443 from cadaveric 
donors. Potentially many more cadaveric kidneys could be harvested. Up to 20,000 Americans die 
annually in circumstances-such as car accidents-that would make their organs suitable for 
transplantation. Organ Transplants, H.R. Rep. No. 769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984); U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation: Issues 
and Recommendations (1986); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for 
Human Organs, 14 J . Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. 57 (1989); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of 
Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
6. UNOS Update (March 1991); USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1); S. Takemoto, E. Car-
nahan and P. I. Terasaki, A Report of 504 Six Antigen-Matched Transplants, 23 Transplantation 
Proc. 1318 (1991). The selection process through which ESRD patients are placed on a waiting list 
IS left largely to the discretion of the local transplant team. Developments in the Law: Medical 
Technology and the Law, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1519, 1630 (1990). A recent study has shown that 
black dialysis patients have a significantly lower chance of being placed on a transplant waiting 
list, even after controlling for a number of health factors that would affect the likelihood of trans-
plant success. J. Michael Soucie, John F. Neylan, and William McClellan, Race and Sex Differ-
mces in the Identification of Candidates for Renal Transplantation, 19 Am. J. Kidney Dis. 414 
11992). Compared to white males, the relative likelihoods that black males and females would be 
placed on a waiting list were .78 and .67 respectively (both statistically significant at .05). The 
process by which dialysis patients are selected for waiting lists is not the focus of this Article, yet it 
also may be a key factor in the disparate access of black patients to kidney transplants. See 103 
Harv. L. Rev. at 1632. 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1988). For example, in 1988 Medicare paid for more than 92% of the 
transplants performed. USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1). See also Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. at 454 (cited in note 4); Peter H. Shuck, Government Funding for Organ Transplants, 14 J. 
Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. 169 (1989). 
8. See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 463-64. 
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the donor as determined by the identification of antigens located on the 
surface of cells.' For example, if a harvested kidney has all the same 
antigens as a potential recipient on the waiting list, then that patient 
will receive the kidney-even if other dialysis patients have waited 
longer for a transplant. 10 
The rationale for basing kidney allocation on "antigen matching" is 
that a recipient who receives a kidney from a donor with similar anti-
gens may be less likely to have her immunologic system reject it. The 
federal guidelines reflect a belief that better antigen matching will lead 
to a higher rate of kidney graft survival and that this interest in maxi-
mizing transplant outcomes should outweigh the equitable claims of pa-
tients who must wait longer for a renal allograft. 
Mandated antigen matching, however, also makes it difficult for 
black dialysis patients to qualify for the pool of scarce cadaveric kid-
neys. Blacks wait almost twice as long as whites for their first trans-
plant-13.9 and 7.6 months respectively.11 While whites comprise sixty-
one percent of the dialysis population, they receive seventy-four percent 
of the kidney transplants.12 In a given year white dialysis patients have 
approximately a seventy-eight percent higher chance of receiving a ca-
daveric transplant than black dialysis patients.18 
The antigen matching rules are a "but for" cause of this racial dis-
parity. Because antigens are distributed differently among racial 
groups, 14 a white patient is more likely than a black patient to have 
9. Antigens are proteins that stimulate an immune response. HLA antigens (human leuko· 
cyte antigens) are found on the surface of nearly all human cells and are the product of genes 
located in the Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) of human DNA at chromosome six. 
Michael Owen, MaJOr Histocompatibility Complex, in Ivan M. Roitt. Jonathan Brostoff and David 
K. Male, eds., Immunology 4.1 (Gower Medical, 2d ed. 1989). These antigens are the key determi· 
nants that enable immunologically active cells to recognize "selr' from "foreign" tissues, sparing 
the former and destroying the latter. While the term "MHC antigens" may be more scientifically 
correct, "HLA" remains in common usage within the transplant community. Efforts to improve 
tissue compatibility by defining these antigens and allocating donated kidneys among recipients in 
a manner that minimizes antigenic differences are known as "HLA matching." In this Article the 
term "antigen matching" refers to this process. 
10. These guidelines are discussed in greater detail in notes 52-58 and accompanying text. 
11. Office of Inspector General, The Distribution of Organs for Transplantation: Expecta-
tions and Practices 8 (1991). 
12. Health Care Financing Administration, End Stage Renal Disease Patient Profile Tables 
(1988). In 1988, 33.5% of dialysis patients were black, but only 22.3% of cadaveric kidney trans· 
plants went to black patients. 
13. In 1988, <4865 cadaveric transplants were distributed among 67,778 white dialysis patients 
(4865 I 67,778 - 7.17%), and 1486 cadaveric transplants were distributed among 36,951 black 
dialysis patients (1486 I 36,951 - 4.02%). USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1). Thus, the likeli· 
hood that a white dialysis patient will receive a kidney in a given year is 78% higher than the 
likelihood that a black patient will receive a kidney ((7.17-4.02)14.02 - 78.4"/o). More detailed 
estimates are discussed in note 67 and accompanying text. 
14. See note 79 and accompanying text. 
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antigens that match those on a kidney from a white donor. Whites do-
nate almost ninety percent of kidneys in the United States. Because the 
proportion of blacks on the waiting list is significantly higher than the 
proportion of kidneys donated by blacks, white patients are more likely 
to have antigens that match those on donated kidneys. Thus, a dispro-
portionately black waiting list chases a disproportionately white donor 
pool. 
Alternative allocation rules could eliminate the racial disparity in 
access to donated kidneys. u A first-come-first-served rule, for example, 
would give all patients equal access to the pool of cadaveric kidneys. 
Several scholars have argued that the best solution to racial disparity in 
transplantation is to increase black donation of both cadaveric and liv-
ing related kidneys.16 They point out that blacks are less likely than 
whites to donate both cadaveric and living related kidneys.17 From this 
they suggest that increasing black donation rates could improve the 
pool of well-matched kidneys for blacks on the waiting list and thus 
mitigate the disparate effects of antigen matching rules.18 
15. To be sure, other factors-including unequal access to waiting lists and a relative inabil-
Ity of blacks to respond when an organ becomes available--contribute to this racial disparity. Fred 
P. Sanfilippo, et al., Factors Affecting the Waiting Time of Cadaueric Kidney Transplant Candi-
dates in the United States, 267 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 247 (1992). 
16. C. 0. Callender, Organ Donation in the Black Population: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, 19 Transplantation Proc. 36 (Supp. 2 1987); Luis M. Perez, et al., Organ Donation in Three 
lajor American Cities with Large Latino and Black Populations, 46 Transplantation 553 (1988). 
17. In 1988 blacks donated only 12% of living related transplants and only 8% of cadaveric 
kidneys. Office of Inspector General, Distribution of Organs for Transplantation at 11 (cited in 
note 11). Studies from New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington D.C. document that blacks 
•-ere markedly underrepresented in donor statistics. Callender, 19 Transplantation Proc. 36 (cited 
m note 16); Perez, et al., 46 Transplantation at 553 (cited in note 16) (saying that black families 
were two to three times less likely to consent to organ donation than white families). 
While the reasons for the lower rate of black organ donation are not fully understood, several 
recent studies have addressed the problem. One found that the most common reasons for donor 
reluctance were lack of information, religion, distrust of medical professionals, fear of premature 
death, and a preference to donate only to members of the same race. Clive 0. Callender, et al., 
Attitudes Among Blacks Toward Donating Kidneys for Transplantation: A Pilot Project, 74 Nat'l 
Med. Ass'n J. 807 (1982); Gallup Organization, Att itudes and Opinions of the American Public 
Towards Kidney Donations (1983), cited in Callender, 19 Transplantation Proc. at 36. 
The lower rate of consent by black families to cadaveric donation may be caused by the failure 
of health care professionals to ask for consent in an effective way. The requests for consent come 
disproportionately from whites. Current studies are investigating whether higher levels of consent 
can be obtained if the persons making the request are of the same race as the potential donor 
family. See The Partnership for Organ Donation and The Annenberg Washington Program, Solu-
ing the Donor Shortage By Meeting Family Needs: A Communications Model (Oct. 30-31, 1990). 
18. The relatively low black donation rate does not justify the unequal access that results 
from the present system. An individual white patient does not have a greater equitable claim to a 
given cadaveric kidney than a black patient simply because blacks as a class donate fewer cadav-
eric kidneys than whites, especially given that the lower rates may be an artifact of disparate 
procurement procedures. See note 17 (discussing the possibility that black families may encounter 
ubstandard requests from medical professionals). Nonetheless, a class-based linking of an alloca-
• 
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Intensified efforts to increase the donation rates of black Ameri-
cans, however, have virtually no chance of eliminating the disparate 
rates of transplantation for blacks and whites. Because the waiting list 
for kidney transplants is so disproportionately black, increasing the rate 
of black donation cannot plausibly equalize the proportions of blacks 
seeking and receiving kidneys. The incidence of ESRD in the United 
States is nearly four times greater for blacks than whites: while blacks 
comprise nearly twelve percent of the general population, thirty-four 
percent of ESRD patients are black.19 To eliminate the disparate im-
pact of antigen matching, blacks would need to donate enough addi-
tional kidneys so that the proportion of black donors would 
approximate the proportion of blacks on the waiting list-thirty-four 
percent.20 To accomplish such an increase, the donation rate for 
blacks-for both cadaveric and living related organs-would have to in-
crease to five times its current rate and more than four times the cur-
rent rate for whites. Increases of this magnitude are unlikely. 21 Efforts 
tion scheme to procurement might induce higher donation rates. The possible dependence of pro-
curement success on the system of allocation is discussed more fully in the text accompanying note 
194. While we favor measures to increase the donation of cadaveric kidneys by blacks, increased 
donation is unlikely to abrogate unequal racial access to transplantation. 
19. USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1). The incidence rate or ESRD in the United States 
is 376 per million for blacks and 99 per million for whites. Dan Gordon, Racial Differences in 
ESRD, 19 Dialysis & Transplantation 114 (1990). 
This disproportionate representation defies easy analysis and may be due to several factors. 
Socioeconomic issues such as diet, accessibility of health care, education, and substance abuse 
surely contribute. A. 0 . Hosten, Kidney Disease in Blacks in North America-An Overview, 19 
Transplantation Proc. at 5 (Supp. 2 1987). However, the key element in black ESRD appears to be 
high blood pressure, or hypertension. 
High blood pressure is more common in blacks for poorly defined reasons. Richard F. Gillum, 
Pathophysiology of Hypertension in Blacks and Whites, 1 Hypertension 468 (1979). Blacks have 
an incidence of hypertension-related ESRD 6.5 times that of whites. In several large series, hyper-
tensive kidney disease is the most common cause of ESRD in blacks. See, for example, Hosten, 19 
Transplantation Proc. 5; Rafael Oriol, Jacques Le Pendu, and Calvin Chun, Influence of the Origi-
nal Disease, Race, and Center on the Outcome of Kidney Transplantation, 33 Transplantation 22 
(1982). Thus, hypertension in the black population seems either to cause or exacerbate renal dis-
ease of all etiologies, hastening the progression to ESRD. 
20. It is possible that even a proportionate representation of donated black kidneys would 
not equalize the rates of antigen matching. Because blacks have more heterogeneous distributions 
of antigen types, it may be less likely that a black patient will match the antigens on a donated 
black kidney than that a white patient will match the antigens on a donated white kidney. 
21. Current efforts to spur black donations, including educational funding and the use of 
blacks to solicit cadaveric donations, have not generated increases of the magnitude required to 
eliminate the disparity. Paul Delaney, Fighting Myths in a Bid to Get Blacks to Consider Trans-
plants, N.Y. Times C17 (Nov. 6, 1991). Substantial increases in the supply of kidneys might be 
achieved by governmental purchase of the right to transplant cadaveric organs. Compare Cohen, 
58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 5); Hansmann, 14 J. Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. at 57 (cited in 
note 5); Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 Hastings Center Report 28 (Oct. 1986); Chris 
Hedges, Egypt's Desperate Trade: Body Parts for Sale, N.Y. Times AI (Sept. 23, 1991). While a 
market-oriented approach deserves careful consideration, we predict that our government is un-
1 UNEQUAL RACIAL ACCESS 811 
maease black donation are laudable and important, but it is mis-
lrlding to argue that increasing black donation rates could significantly 
reduce disparate racial access to transplantation. 21 
This Article explores whether the disparate racial impact of man-
dated antigen matching is justified by higher overall survival rates of 
kidney transplants.13 Recent advances in the use of drugs that effec-
tively suppress immune responses have dramatically altered the impact 
ol antigen matching-the likelihood of graft survival may now be rela-
tively independent of the degree of antigen matching. Our tentative 
conclusion is that technological advances have made antigen-based allo-
cation less critical to transplant success. 
Normatively, we argue that the equitable claims of black dialysis 
patients for cadaveric kidneys outweigh the marginal improvement in 
transplant outcomes currently associated with matching. Guido Cala-
bresi and Philip Bobbitt have reasoned: 
(C]orrected egalitarianism ... plays an unusually influential role in the American 
concept of equality. It accepts the general premise of formal egalitarianism that 
discrimination is proper so long as likes are treated alike, but corrects the operation 
of this premise by rejecting it whenever methods applying it happen to produce 
results which correlate the permissible category of discrimination-health, for ex-
ample-with an impermissible one, such as wealth or race.•• 
The federally mandated system for allocating kidneys has produced just 
this impermissible effect based on an increasingly weak correlation with 
health or transplant survival. Recent proposals to expand the influence 
of antigen matching on organ allocation would further increase racial 
disparity in transplantation.211 While the disparate racial impact of anti-
likely to adopt such an approach in the near future. Given the types of public and private initia-
tives that might plausibly be undertaken, the proportion of blacks on waiting lists almost certainly 
will continue to be higher than the proportion of cadaveric kidneys donated by blacks. 
22. For example, a recent article implicitly ascribes the racial disparity in transplantation 
solely to rates of donation saying that "the lack of organs donated by blacks makes transplants to 
blacks more difficult" Delaney, N.Y. Times at C17 (cited in note 21). 
23. At the outset, it is important to note that for most potential recipients allocation of kid-
neys for transplantation is not a matter of life or death due to the alternative treatment offered by 
dialysis. However, as noted previously, most authorities consider transplantation to be an optimal 
therapy. See Eggers, 318 New Eng. J. Med. at 223 (cited in note 4); USRDS 1990 Report {cited in 
note 1). Inexplicably, blacks have lower mortality rates on dialysis than whites. In 1986, for exam-
ple, blacks on dialysis had a 23% lower mortality rate than whites. Gordon, 19 Dialysis & Trans-
plantation at 114 (cited in note 19). Thus, one might justify the disparate racial impact of antigen 
matching as a way of decreasing ESRD mortality by taking disproportionate numbers of whites off 
dialysis, which is relatively more risky for them. 
24. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 25 (Norton, 1978). 
25. See David W. Gjertson, et al., National Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys by HLA Match-
ing, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (1991) (proposing to create a single national waiting list and to 
allocate every kidney procured within the United States to the potential recipient with best anti-
gen match). See also Steve Takemoto, et al., Suruival of Nationally Shared, HLA-Matched Kid-
ney Transplants from Cadaveric Donors, 327 New Eng. J . Med. 834 (1992). 
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gen matching has been intensely analyzed within the transplant com-
munity in the last two years,118 it has been largely ignored in the legal 
literature.117 
The Article also serves as a case study of the difficulty of adminis-
tering regulations in the face of conflicting and evolving empirical data. 
The increased demand for donor organs has intensified debate over al-
location, but the issues are not new. While some within the transplant 
community argue that allocation based on antigen matching is the most 
scientifically sound method, others contend that factors such as newer 
drug therapies, evolving technology, and equitable access are of greater 
importance.28 In the absence of firm empirical results, one of the most 
important normative choices will be allocating burdens of 
proof-because without certain knowledge about the benefits of antigen 
matching or new drug therapies, much will turn on presumptions. 
The time is now ripe to consider these issues. While the allocation 
system was originally developed without the procedural protections of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, the Department of Health and 
Human Service (HHS) has decided to develop and submit for comment 
a notice of proposed rulemaking to replace the mandatory allocation 
system devised by UNOS. 28 HHS expects to publish proposed alloca-
tion rules in the Federal Register in the near future. so This procedural 
change may give those concerned with inequitable racial allocation an 
opportunity to overcome regulatory inertia. 
Part II of this Article provides the factual background. There, we 
describe in more detail the federal rules governing ant igen matching 
and the reasons why these rules cause disparate racial access to cadav-
26. See, for example, S. M. Greenstein, et al., Does Kidney Distribution Based Upon HLA 
Matching Discriminate Against Blacks?, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3874 (1989); Bertram L. 
Kasiske, et al., The Effect of Race on Access and Outcome in Transplantation, 324 New Eng. J. 
Med. 302 (1991); V. A. Lazda and M. E. Blaesing, Is Allocation of Kidneys on Basis of HLA 
Match Equitable in Multiracial Populations?, 21 Transplantation Proc. 1415 (1989). T he dispa· 
rate access to cadaveric kidneys by blacks has also been a central concern of public officials. See 
Office of Inspector General, Distribution of Organs for Transplantation (cited in note 1); Remarks 
of Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services at the Partnership for Organ Dona-
tion's Consensus Conference (1991). 
27. For example, a 1989 issue of a prominent health law journal that was devoted entirely to 
organ transplantation failed to even refer to this concern. See James F. Blumstein and Frank A. 
Sloan, eds., 14 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 1 (1989). 
28. Both groups can produce scientific evidence supportive of their respective positions. 
Compare L. G. Hunsicker and Philip J. Held, The Role of HLA Matching for Cadaveric Renal 
Transplants in the Cyclosporine Era, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (1992) with Gjertson, et al., 
324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25). 
29. Letter of James 0. Mason, Asst. Secretary for Health, to Robert J. Corry, President of 
UNOS (Sept. 22, 1989) [hereinafter "Mason Letter"]. 
30. Conversation with Reny Aronoss, HRSA project officer who oversees contract with UNOS 
(Sept. 4, 1992) [hereinafter "Aronoss Conversation"]. 
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eric kidney transplants. We also explore the degree to which antigen 
matching improves the likelihood of successful transplanta-
bOn-focusing on newer immunological therapies that increasingly may 
divorce graft survival from antigenic similarity. 
Part III explores difficult normative issues of kidney allocation. In 
our effort to justify a system that devalues antigen matching, we con-
sider the ethical choices that must be made-implicitly or explicitly-in 
choosing one system of allocation over another. In particular, we pose in 
concrete terms the tradeoff between enhanced graft survival and equi-
table allocation of available kidneys. We propose specific allocation 
rules that seek to strike a more appropriate ethical and clinical balance. 
Finally, Part IV examines the potential viability of a suit challeng-
ang the current regulations on a disparate impact theory. It should be 
emphasized that here, as in other contexts,31 the presence of disparate 
racial outcomes should not be taken to imply racial animus or bigotry 
on the part of any of the relevant advocates or decisionmakers. To the 
contrary, it is our firm belief that there is a surfeit of good faith among 
the various actors in the transplant community. The differences of 
opinion are inevitable and, indeed, a healthy byproduct of thoughtful 
responses to these complex and important issues. 
II. ANTIGEN MATCHING 
A. The UNOS Policies for Mandated Sharing of Well-Matched 
Kidneys 
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA)32 provided 
funds for HHS to establish the Organ Procurement and Transplanta-
tion Network (OPTN).18 The OPTN was to be a nonprofit organization 
devoted to establishing (i) a national list of people who need organs, 34 
(ii) a national system to match organs and individuals on the list,811 and 
(iii) criteria for allocating organs.38 In 1986 HHS awarded the OPTN 
contract to a pre-existing entity, the United Network for Organ Sharing 
31. See, for example, Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
'egottations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991). 
32. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273, 274(a)-(e) (1988 
and Supp. II 1990). 
33. Id. at § 274. An excellent summary of federal regulation of organ t ransplantation is pro-
vided by Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 461-76 (cited in note 4). 
34. 42 u.s.c. § 274(b) (1988). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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(UNOS), which had already established a central computer registry of 
potential kidney recipients. 87 
The 1984 act also provided grants for qualified Organ Procurement 
Organizations (OP0s).88 NOTA required OPOs to have effective agree-
ments "with a substantial majority" of the transplanting hospitals 
within a service area to acquire and allocate all usable organs "equita-
bly among transplant patients according to established medical crite-
ria."" To qualify for grants, OPOs also had to be members of the 
OPTN, but OPTN membership was not a legal prerequisite for either 
procuring or transplanting kidneys. As Professor James Blumstein 
summarized: 
To the extent that the Network was useful and provided a service, transplant cen-
ters and their patients could benefit from the system of coordination. To the extent 
that other avenues of donation and procurement were available and more attrac-
tive, transplant centers and their patients were free to utilize those other sources 
and resources as well. •o 
The voluntary participation in the OPTN changed, however, in 1986 
with the passage of the Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(SOBRA)41 and its addition of Section 1138 to the Social Security Act.u 
Section 1138 requires that to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid reim-
bursements, hospitals with transplant programs must be members of 
the OPTN (i.e., UNOS) and abide by its rules. Compliance with the 
policies of UNOS is a prerequisite not only for Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement relating to transplantation, but for all Medicare and 
Medicaid payments. Section 1138 thus effectively mandates compliance 
with UNOS's policies" because noncompliance means that the hospital 
37. See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 463 (cited in note 4); Frank A. Sloan, May W. 
Shayne and Marilyn D. Doyle, Is There a Rationale for Regionalizing Organ Transplantation 
Services?, 14 J . Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 115, 127 (1989). As an overview for understanding HHS's 
supervision of UNOS, it is useful to introduce the relevant administrative actors that directly or 
indirectly control transplantation policy. The Division of Organ Transplantation is part of the 
Bureau of Health Resources Department which is part of the Health Resources and Services Ad-
ministration (HRSA, pronounced her'-sa) which is part of HHS. In addition, the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA, pronounced hick'-fa) is responsible for the administration of 
Medicare and Medicaid coverage for kidney transplants. HCFA is also a part of HHS. 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a){1),(2) (1988). 
39. ld. at § 273(b)(3). 
40. Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 464 (cited in note 4). 
41. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986). 
42. ld. § 9318(a), 100 Stat. at 2009-10. Section 1138 of the Social Security Act is codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (1988 and Supp. II 1990). See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 467 (cited 
in note 4). 
43. UNOS Policy 1.0 establishes: "By acceptance of membership in UNOS, each member 
agrees to be bound by all provisions of the UNOS Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Poli-
cies." UNOS Policy 1.0 (1991). 
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"forgo Medicare and Medicaid payment for all services, not just 
plant services. uu 
1. An Introduction to Antigen Compatibility 
Current UNOS policies explicitly mandate allocation of cadaveric 
Ddneys to potential recipients with antigens similar to those of the do-
DOl'. Before examining the specifics of these policies, it is useful to pro-
ftde a brief introduction to antigen matching. An antigen is a protein 
oa the surface of tissues that can stimulate an immune response. HLA 
utigens enable white blood cells-the primary immunologically-active 
cellJ of the body-to distinguish between "self' and "foreign., tissue.411 
nless suppressed by drug therapy, the immune system will attack tis-
IUe that it recognizes as foreign, but ignore "self' tissue. If kidney tis-
tue bearing specific antigens is transplanted into a person whose tissue 
does not bear those antigens, then the immune system of the recipient 
will attack the transplanted tissue in a process known as rejection. As 
will be stressed below,•• however, the immune system can be suppressed 
by drugs, enabling transplanted kidneys to survive, even in the presence 
of foreign antigens. 
Antigens are the expression, or phenotype, of Major Histocompa-
tibility Complex (MHC) genes. Current techniques cannot detect MHC 
differences at the genomic level in humans; however, phenotypic differ-
ences-differing antigens on the surface of cells-are readily detected 
by a process known as tissue typing.47 Sets of antigens at three loca-
44. 53 Fed. Reg. 6525, 6529-30 (1988) (emphasis in original) (to be codified in scattered sec-
uons of 42 C.F.R.). Section 1138 gave the OPTN contracting party (UNOS) potentially coercive 
power that was criticized because it was unchecked by traditional due procesa protections. See, for 
eumple, Mason. Letter (cited in note 29); Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 496 (cited in note 
4). The Organ Transplant Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3114, responds 
in part to these concerns by mandating publication of its policie and providing "members of the 
public an opportunity to comment." Id. at 3115. HHS has determined that the UNOS policies 
must be submitted to the HHS Secretary for approval and must follow Administrative Procedure 
Act guidelines for proposed rulemaking and ultimate publication in the Code of Federal Regula-
tiona. Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network Rules and Actions, 54 Fed. Reg. 51802, 51803 (1989). 
45. The principal white blood cells involved in immune response are called lymphocytes. In 
the human body there are approximately 1012 (one trillion) lymphocytes, each of which recognizes 
a aingle antigen from among the universe of all possible antigens. As the immune system develops, 
thoee lymphocytes that recognize and destroy "self' tissues are deleted. When, however, trans-
planted tiasues with foreign antigens are recognized by lymphocytes, the process of immunologic 
destruction, or "rejection," is initiated. Rejection is the bane of transplantation: if untreated, it 
reeult.s in the loss of the transplanted organ. Ken Welsh and David Male, Transplantation. and 
Rejection, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan Brostotr, and David K. Male, eds., Immunology 24.1 (Gower 
Mf'dical, 2d ed. 1989). 
46. See Part II.C.4. 
47. The basic tiasue typing technique involves placing the tissue cells to be typed into nu-
merous "wells," each with a different type of serum known to contain antibodies to a specific 
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tions, or loci, on the cell surface have been found to be particularly rele-
vant in transplantation. These three antigen loci are denoted A, B, and 
DR, and different specificities are commonly labelled by number. For 
example, at the A locus common antigens include A1, All, and A25. 
Each person has two antigens at each locus48-one inherited from each 
parent-totalling six antigens altogether. In the absence of immunosup-
pressive drugs, these antigens strongly affect whether a recipient's im-
mune system will attack a transplanted kidney!9 
Only identical twins possess identical MHC genes and HLA anti-
gens at all loci; their tissues are thus immunologically interchangeable. 
Indeed, the earliest successful kidney transplants were between twins. 
As antigens were identified in the early and mid 1960s, doctors hoped 
that by matching antigens between donor and recipient as closely as 
possible the results achievable in twins could be approximated with 
minimal immunosuppression. In transplants from living relatives of the 
recipient this has proven true because genetic inheritance of all anti-
gens makes phenotypic status (antigen matching) a good proxy for the 
underlying genotypic status. However, with transplantation of cadaveric 
organs, which are obtained from persons of diverse genetic back-
grounds, the use of antigen matching is a poorer proxy for the underly-
ing MHC genes that more directly control the immune response. In 
order to successfully transplant organs between any nontwin donor-re-
cipient pairs, immune responses must be suppressed in some way, usu-
ally by drugs. Thus, while antigen matching has from its inception 
accurately predicted outcomes in living-related transplantation, its role 
when cadaveric donors are used has been controversial. 
antigen (e.g., A2). If the antibodies of a particular serum result in the death of the tissue cells that 
are to be typed, one can infer that the cells must have that particular antigen expressed on their 
surface. Michael Steward and David Male, Immunological Techniques, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan 
Brostoff and David K. Male, eds., Immunology 25.1 (Gower Medical, 2d ed. 1989). 
48. An A locus might, for example, have both the Al and All antigens. 
49. In some patients tissue typing is unable to identify six different antigens. For example, 
tissue typing might identify only the Al antigen at the A locus. Current techniques would thus 
define a total of five (lA, 2B, and 2DR) rather than six antigens in such a person, who would be 
said to have a "blank" at the A locus. Blanks may represent either as yet unidentified antigen 
specificities or "homozygosity." A person would be homozygous on the A locus if both A antigens 
were, for instance, All. Such a kidney would be "phenotypically" matched to be transplanted into 
a recipient who had the donor's five antigens and any additional antigen at the donor's homozy-
gotic locus. Again, as long as the donor kidney does not have antigens present that are absent in 
the recipient, the recipient's immune response may be weaker. 
Blanks in blacks may be more likely to represent as yet unidentified antigens than homozygos-
ity. See note 47 (discussing tissue typing with serum). It is well documented that HLA antigen 
expression is less well-defined in blacks than whites. A. H. Johnson, S. Rosen-Bronson and C. K. 
Hurley, Heterogeneity of the HLA-D Region in American Blacks, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3872 
(1989). 
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Another type of antigen matching relevant to transplantation con-
cerns blood group (ABO) compatibility. Antigens that distinguish blood 
types A, B, and 0 are also present on the surface of kidney tissue. 60 
Blood types A and B, for example, refer to blood cells that have either 
orB antigens, respectively. Just as type A blood cannot be transfused 
into a patient with type B blood, neither will a type B recipient accept 
a kidney from a type A donor. Donor and recipient must have compati-
ble blood type antigens regardless of the type of immunosuppressant 
drug therapy. Blood type 0, however, refers to the absence of either the 
A or B antigens. Hence, type 0 kidneys can be transplanted into either 
type A or type B recipients. Persons who are type 0 are said to be 
"universal" donors, but can receive kidneys (or blood) only from others 
of the same blood type. Conversely, a small fraction of persons possess 
both the A and B antigens blood type AB and are universal 
recipients. 5 1 
2. Mandatory National Sharing of Six-Antigen-Matched Kidneys 
The current UNOS policies privilege antigen matching in two sepa-
rate ways. First, the policies mandate that all "six antigen matched" 
kidneys be shared on a national basis.152 The policy is implemented in 
the following manner. When an ESRD patient is placed into the UNOS 
computer registry, his or her blood type and HLA antigens are also re-
corded. As a cadaveric kidney becomes available, blood and tissue typ-
ing are immediately performed on the donor, and the results are 
entered into the computer registry. If a donated kidney is a six-antigen 
match with an ABO compatible dialysis patient on the UNOS waiting 
list, then "it is mandatory that the kidney shall be offered for the six 
antigen match patient. "63 
The six-antigen match is, however, a term of art that includes a 
growing number of harvested kidneys.15• If tissue typing identifies only 
one antigen on each of the three loci of the donor that is, three blanks 
50. The Rh + or Rh- blood-type antigen that distinguishes, for example, blood type 0 -posi-
tive from 0-negative js not present in kidney tissue and is not relevant to transplantation. 
51. David Male, Reactions Against Blood Cells and Platelets, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan 
Brostoff and David K. Male, eds., Immunology 20.4 (Gower Medical, 2d ed. 1989). 
52. The UNOS policies on their face govern the allocation of kidney from living related 
donors as well as from cadavers. This means that a kidney donated by the sibling of a dialysis 
patient could potentially qualify as a six-antigen match with nonrelated recipients. The guidelines 
mandate that this kidney be offered first to the unrelated six-antigen match. See Blumstein, 22 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 486-88 (ctted in note 4). In practice, however, kidney ~ from family members 
are considered to be udonated" for a specific recipient and are not subject to allocation guidelines. 
53. UNOS Policy 3.3.3 (1992). If there is more than one six-antigen-matched patient, the 
kidney shall be offered to the patient with the highest number of UNOS points. Id. The UNOS 
point system is discussed in note 61 and accompanying text. 
54. UNOS defines a "six antigen match" to be 
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are present1111-a donated kidney may still qualify as a six-antigen 
match.118 This effective redefinition of a six-antigen match to mean a 
"zero antigen mismatch" has important implications for the number of 
transplants governed by UNOS's mandatory sharing policy. HLA anti-
gens are distributed so that fewer than ten percent of cadaveric dona-
tions go to true six-antigen-matched recipients.117 This number may be 
as high as twenty-five percent, however, if a zero antigen mismatch 
standard is used instead.118 
3. The Mandatory Local Point System 
If a cadaveric kidney does not qualify as a six-antigen match for 
national sharing, then UNOS policies mandate that the cadaveric kid-
neys be allocated locally&" according to the point system set out in Ta-
ble 1.80 
a match between a donor and recipient where the recipient is ABO compatible and matched 
on all 6 HLA-A, B, and DR antigens with the donor or there is phenotypic identity between 
the donor and recipient where at least one antigen is identified at the A, B, loci and DR loci. 
UNOS Policy 3.3.1 (1992). 
55. The identification of a single antigen on an individual locus can signify two very different 
things. First, as discussed in note 49, the presence of a blank might mean that the locus is homozy-
gotic in that both antigens on that locus are the same. Conversely, a blank could signify the pres-
ence of an as yet undefined antigen specificity. Current tests cannot distinguish between the two. 
The rationale for this aspect of the guidelines is that as tissue typing has become more reliable, 
blanks are more likely to define homozygosity, which would pose less of a barrier to successful 
transplantation than unidentified antigens. 
There are, however, a large number of antigens that still cannot be typed by laboratory serum. 
In a recent national study, laboratories were unable to identify antigens on the DR locus for more 
than 30% of the white population and for more than 40o/o of the black population. E. L. Milford, 
L. Ratner, and E. Yunis, Will Transplant Immunogenetics Lead to Better Graft Survival in 
Blacks?-Racial Variability in the Accuracy o{ Tissue Typing {or Organ Donation: The Fourth 
American Workshop, 19 Transplantation Proc. 30, 31 (Supp. 2 1987). 
56. On January 21, 1991 UNOS extended this definition further to cover blanks discovered 
on the DR locus as well so that kidneys with only three identified antigens may qualify for six-
antigen-matched treatment. UNOS Policy Proposal Statement (Jan. 21, 1991). 
57. M. Ray Mickey, Daniel J. Cook, and Paul I. Terasaki, Recipient Pool Sizes for Priori-
tized HLA Matching, 47 Transplantation 401 (1989). 
58. ld. See also Paull. Terasaki, Steve Takemoto and M. Ray Mickey, A Report on 123 Sir· 
Antigen Matched Cadaver Kidney Transplants, 3 Clinical Transplantation 301 (1989); note 25 
and accompanying text. 
59. The cadaveric kidney shall be allocated among the list of local recipients defined to be 
"either the individual transplant center recipient list or a shared list of recipients within a defined 
procurement area and shall be no larger than the OPO." UNOS Policy 3.5.1 (1992). 
60. UNOS Policy 3.5 (1992). Prior to 1987 each local transplant program could set its own 
allocation policy. In 1987 UNOS adopted the "Starzl'' system, which awarded up to 10 points for 
waiting time, 12 for quality of antigen match, 10 for presensitization (discussed in note 61), 10 for 
"medical urgency," and 6 for logistical factors such as proximity to the hospital. Thomas E. Starzl, 
et al., A Multifactorial System {or Equitable Selection of Cadaver Kidney Recipients, 257 J. Am. 
Med. Ass'n 3073 (1987). See generally J. Michael Dennis, A Review of Centralized Rule-Making in 
American Transplantation, 6 Transplantation Rev. 130, 132 (1992) (recounting the history of the 
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l. UNOS POINT SYSTEM FOR SELECTING KIDNEY TRANSPLANT 
RECIPIENTS 
Points 
HLA matching 
0 · A, B, DR mismatch 10 
0 · B, DR mismatch 7 
0 · A, B mismatch 6 
1 · B, DR mismatch 3 
2 · B, DR mismatch 2 
3 · B, DR mismatch 1 
Waiting Time 
Patient with longest waiting period 1 
(proportionate points for shorter periods) 
Each year on waiting list .5 
Children 
Age 0-5 2 
Age 6-10 1 
Presensitization61 4 
The point system places heavy weight on the quality of the antigen 
t.Ch, making ten out of approximately seventeen possible points con-
ent on the number of antigens matched. In contrast, the system 
only one point to the patient who has waited for the longest pe-
:trw.Jopment of the point system). In 1989 the current point system, known as the "Terasaki modi-
," was adopted. 
tsl. UNOS Policy 3.5.3 (1992). Four points are awarded if the recipient shows a high likeli-
.... ol reacting immunologically to more than 80% of the potential donors, but displays a nega-
croumatch with a particular donor. A positive crossmatch indicates that the recipient already 
produced antibodies against the donor's HLA antigens and thus precludes placing a kidney 
._ that donor into that recipient. All persons on a waiting list have their blood tested periodi-
(uaually monthly) for antibodies against HLA antigens in a laboratory test. This is done using 
'"'paDel" of cells from approximately 40 random donors. If a person's blood reacts with 10 of 40 
....... he or she is said to have 25% panel reactive antibodies (PRA), implying approximately a 
1'. chance of reacting positively with any single donor from the larger population of potential 
......._ Thus, for patients with high (~ 80%) PRA levels, it is difficult to find a donor with a 
-.ptive crossmatch. 
The rationale for this rule is that because the recipient has demonstrated poor compatibility 
the larger population of potential donors, but has shown a preliminary compatibility with a 
...ucutar donor, he or she should receive the kidney. Put simply, extra points are awarded be-
a better match is not likely to come along. Transplantation to these recipients is privileged 
order to provide equitable access, not to maximize success rates. Indeed, patients with high PRA 
may comprise a group at "high risk" for graft loss. Prasad Koka and J. M. Cecka, Sensitiza-
and Crossmatching in Renal Transplantation, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 
3i9 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1989}. 
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riod; those who have not waited as long get fractions of a point. n The 
point system also awards an additional one-half point for each addi-
tional year on the waiting list after one year.88 The net result is almost 
complete emphasis on antigen matching in determining allocation, with 
time on the waiting list serving largely as a tie-breaker. Thus, in vying 
for a particular kidney, a patient with only one antigen matched could 
conceivably be awarded a kidney over someone who had waited up to 
two years longer. •• 
B. The Costs of Matching: Disparate Access to Cadaveric Kidneys 
This Part argues that blacks have disproportionately limited access 
to cadaveric kidneys and that the mandatory allocation system based 
on antigen matching contributes to this racial disparity.•• The first task 
is relatively straightforward. As discussed above," 33.5% of dialysis pa-
tients in 1988 were black, but blacks received only 22.3% of cadaveric 
kidney transplants. Detailed studies of national and regional data un-
derscore the fact that white dialysis patients may have more than a fifty 
percent greater chance of receiving a transplant.87 A multivariate analy-
sis conducted by the Urban Institute indicates that even after control-
ling for a host of other socioeconomic variables, the likelihood of 
cadaveric transplants for blacks relative to whites is only fifty-five per-
cent." This disparity in access to cadaveric kidneys means blacks have 
to wait almost twice as long as whites for their first transplant (13.9 
months for blacks as compared to 7.6 months for whites) .69 
At least a portion of this disparity is attributable to matching ABO 
blood groups, as required by UNOS policy.70 ABO compatibility is re-
62. UNOS Policy 3.5.2 (1992). 
63. Id. 
64. For example, a patient with no A locus matches and one out of four B and DR matches 
and who had just been placed on the waiting list would receive one point for the antigen match (3 -
B, DR mismatch). A patient with no antigen matches could wait almost two years and receive only 
one point for his or her relative seniority on the waiting list (additional half points accrue only if 
the additional year is completed). 
65. This is not to say that other factors do not impede equal opportunities for blacks who 
need transplants. A host of socioeconomic factors may also play a role. See notes 15 and 17. 
66. See note 12. 
67. See, for example, Carl. M. Kjellstrand, Age, Sex, and Race Inequality in Renal Trans-
plantation, 148 Arch. Intern. Med. 1305 (1988). In the United States in 1983, white patients had a 
30% transplant rate and nonwhite patients had a 20% rate: " [N)onwhite patients aged 21 to 45 
years had only half the chance of receiving a transplant compared with white patients of the same 
age and sex." ld. at 1305. 
68. Philip J . Held, et al., Access to Kidney Transplantation: Has the United States Elimi-
nated Income and Racial Differences?, 148 Arch. Intern. Med. 2594, 2596 (1988). 
69. See note 11 and accompanying text . 
70. See UNOS Policy 3.3.1 (1992). The antigenic basis of blood typing is discussed at notes 
50-51 and accompanying text. 
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for successful transplantation. As Table 2 demonstrates, the 
requirement of ABO compatibility causes white dialysis pa-
to receive a disproportionate share of cadaveric kidneys because 
atigens are distributed differently in whites and blacks.71 
2. DISTRIBUTION OF ABO BLOOD GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Group White Black Av. Waiting List Time 
0 45% 49% 14.3 mos. 
A 40 27 6.9 
8 11 20 15.7 
AB 4 4 4.6. 
particular, the large pool of blood type A donations will go dispro-
Jllllrtionately to white recipients.'2 
The UNOS rules, however, go beyond the medical requirement of 
ABO compatibility by mandating that blood type 0 kidneys, which are 
ersal donors, be transplanted only into patients with blood type 
0 n This "0 rule" prohibits types A and B from competing for donated 
0 kidneys. The UNOS 0 rule was promulgated to provide equal access 
0 recipients for whom only an 0 kidney is suitable and who in the 
t were thought to have waited inordinately long for a transplant.'• 
OD balance, however, the 0 rule reduces blacks's ability to qualify for 
kidney transplants. Blacks are almost twice as likely as whites to have 
blood type B (twenty percent versus eleven percent).n Under the 0 rule 
k dialysis patients who have blood type B must wait for a relatively 
IIID8.ll supply of type B kidneys.'e If the rule were repealed, these pa-
tients could look to the much larger pool of 0 donors because forty-five 
il Frances K. Widmann, ed., Technical Manual of the American Association of Blood 
I American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 9th ed. 1985); Kasiske, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 302 
cited in note 26). 
i2. "The fact that whites (40 percent of whom have blood group A) make up the majority of 
.rpn donors suggests that cadaver kidneys will more often go to whites than to blacks (27 percent 
fll .-hom have blood group A)." Kasiske, et a!., 324 New Eng. J. Med. at 302-03. 
i3. UNOS Policy 3.4 (1992). An exception to this rule is allowed for "six antigen matched 
_.uents who have a blood group other than 0 ." ld. This exception to the 0 kidney rule is likely to 
whites disproportionately. It is much more likely that white recipients with, for example, 
Wood type A, will meet the six-antigen qualification for a type 0 cadaveric kidney. As discussed in 
detail at text accompanying notes 87-90, this results from the higher propensity of white donors to 
Mve six antigen matches with white recipients. 
i4. F. K. Port, et al. , Discrepancies in the Distribution of Renal Allografts Cause Prolonged 
01tmg Times for Blood Type 0 Patients, 35 Kidney lnt'l 522 (1989). See also F. K. Port, et a!., 
1lu Impact of Nonidentical ABO Cadaueric Renal Transplantation on Waiting Times and Graft 
rtwal, 17 Am. J. Kidney Dis. 519 (1991). 
75. See text accompanying note 71. 
76. Again, this is because most cadaveric kidneys come from a white population that has only 
ll"fo type B kidneys. 
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percent of white donors have blood type 0. Although the 0 rule helps 
black recipients with blood type 0, an analysis of these competing ef-
fects using differential equations suggests that the blood type B effect 
dominates. 77 The likely effect of the 0 rule is to increase the percentage 
of blacks on the waiting list and the amount of time the average black 
has to wait. 78 
Of greater importance, however, are the UNOS policies that man-
date organ allocation based on HLA antigen matching. These regula-
tions restrict the availability of cadaveric kidneys for black patients for 
the simple reason that most donors are white, and white kidneys tend 
to have different antigens than black kidneys. The American Society of 
Histocompatibility and Immunogenetics recently reported a study of 
HLA antigen frequency. With the participation of eighty-three tissue-
typing laboratories, the study showed that twenty-two antigens on the 
A, B, and DR loci have statistically significant differences in the fre-
quency of appearance in blacks and whites. These disparate frequencies 
are shown in Table 3. 
77. See Appendix. An analysis of differential equations suggests that blood type B patients 
will need to wait much longer for kidneys than blood type A patients-even though under the 0 
rule neither blood type A nor B patients can qualify for donated 0 kidneys. The reason that the 0 
rule hurts blood type B patients more than blood type A patients is that the donated kidneys are 
disproportionately white and therefore disproportionately blood type A relative to ESRD patients. 
ESRD patients with blood type A accordingly have a relatively large pool of cadaveric kidneys 
even without receiving 0 type transplants. Blood type B recipients, however, face a very small pool 
of donated type B kidneys and, accordingly, are dramatically affected by the inability to qualify 
for type 0 cadaveric transplants. 
78. The average waiting list times reported above support this analysis. Under the 0 rule the 
average waiting time for the predominanUy black B recipients is higher than for 0 recipients (15.7 
months > 14.3 months), while the average waiting time for the predominantly white A recipients 
is lower than for 0 recipients (6.9 months < 14.3 months). The 0 rule reduces the waiting time for 
type 0 recipients and increases the waiting times for blood type A and particularly for type B 
recipients. 
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TABLE 3. ANTIGEN FREQUENCY BY RACE 
Antigen White (%) Black (%) 
Locus Antigens: Disproportionately White 
A1 23.4 9.8 
All 11.8 3.7 
A24 16.4 6.1 
A25 6.8 0.9 
Disproportionately Black 
A23 5.6 22.3 
A30 7.0 22.0 
Aw33 4.6 16.2 
Aw34 0.8 13.1 
Aw36 0.2 9.1 
Locus Antigens: Disproportionately White 
B8 12.4 5.8 
B13 5.1 1.2 
B27 7.5 1.2 
B38 6.9 0.6 
B44 16.4 8.8 
Bw60 7.8 0.9 
Bw62 9.0 2.1 
Disproportionately Black 
Bw42 1.4 14.6 
B45 2.0 8.8 
Bw53 1.4 17.4 
Bw58 1.6 11.9 
DR" Locus Antigens: Disproportionately White 
DR4 20.0 6.1 
Disproportionately Black 
DR9 2.4 4.9.79 
These differences in frequency of antigen expression are exacerbated by 
t doctors call "linkage disequilibrium. "80 The expression of certain 
tigens on one locus is often positively correlated (or "linked") with 
i9. Milford, Ratner and Yunis, 19 Transplantation Proc. at 31 (cited in note 55) 
Owen, Major Histocompatibility Complex, in Immunology 4.1·.11 (cited in note 9). See 
M.R. Mickey and Paul r. Terasaki, The Serological Data of the 8th Workshop and Summary 
) es, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Histocompatibility Testing 21 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Labora-
• 1980); G. Opelz and A. Engelman, Effect of HLA Matching in Cyclosporine-Treated Black 
' Transplant Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3881 (1989). 
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particular antigens at another locus. This linkage exacerbates these ra-
cial differences because a black recipient failing to match a white donor 
on one locus may be less likely to match at other loci as well. 
Not surprisingly, these disparate antigen pools cause blacks to have 
fewer potential antigen matches with a predominantly white cadaveric 
donor pool. A recent study in Illinois calculated how well 352 cadaveric 
kidneys matched 604 patients on the local UNOS waiting list.111 The 
study revealed that while only 52% of the overall waiting list was white, 
whites dominated the class of recipients having four or more antigens 
matching-with 71.8% of these well-matched kidneys.111 Since the ma-
jority of donors is white, such disparity in antigen distribution, coupled 
with an allocation system based heavily on HLA matching, places po-
tential black recipients at a significant disadvantage. Several studies re-
veal that white patients receive the vast majority of kidney transplants 
with excellent donor-recipient histocompatibility-more than four anti-
gen matches.113 
Another recent study shows directly that UNOS's emphasis of anti-
gen matching reduces the number of blacks that qualify for transplan-
tation. Lazda analyzed an alternative point system approved by 
UNOS-termed a "variance"-for the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois 
(ROBI).'" Operating under the UNOS variance, ROBI allocates cadav-
eric kidneys under a point system that emphasizes time on the waiting 
list more strongly relative to the quality of the antigen match than does 
the UNOS system.81 Larger numbers of black candidates received 
transplants under the ROBI variance.1111 
81. Lazda and Blaesing, 21 Transplantation Proc. 1415 (cited in note 26). 
82. ld. at 1415. Potential black recipients, who made up 39.9% of the overall waiting list, 
comprised only 16.2% of the four or more antigen matches. These discrepancies are further exacer-
bated if the analysis is restricted to matching the cadaveric kidneys from white donors. In that 
case white patients would receive 75.2% of the four or more antigen matches, and black patients 
would receive only 14%. These latter figures may be more relevant on a nationwide level because 
the lllinois study contained a relatively elevated proportion of cadaveric kidneys from black donors 
(13.9%). 
83. ld. See also Velta A. Lazda, The Impact of HLA Frequency D1{ferences m Races on the 
Access to Optimally HLA·Matched Cadaver Renal Transplants, 53 Transplantation 352 (1992); 
Robert S. Gaston, et al., Improved Survit'CII of Primary Cadaueric Renal Allografts in Blacks with 
Quadruple lmmuno8uppre881on, 53 Transplantation 103 (1992). 
84. V. A. Lazda, An Evaluation of a Local Variance of the United Network for Organ Shar· 
mg (UNOS) Point System on the Distribution of Cadaver Kidneys to Waiting Minority Recipi-
ents, 23 Transplantation Proc. 901 (1991). 
85. As summarized by J . Michael Dennis: "The main difference [between the UNOS and 
ROBI point systems) is that ROBI gives no points to two of the less match grades (2 and 3 BDR 
mismatches) and offers slightly more points for length of wait." J. Michael Dennis, American 
Blacks, Kidney Transplantation & The Politics of Local Jnequalrty (1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
86. Id. 
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Tbe disparate racial impact is even more extreme with regard to 
mandatory sharing of six-antigen matches. The initial study of 
••~atory sharing of six-antigen-matched kidneys revealed that of 123 
••plalllts, blacks received only two.87 Subsequent studies have con-
this virtual exclusion of blacks from the pool of six-antigen-
transplants at the national level, although when six-antigen 
•lleb is redefined as "zero-antigen mismatch" the proportion of kid-
coing to blacks rises to seven percent.88 A recent study from the 
--ftl~ity of Alabama at Birmingham, where the waiting list is sixty-
~rcent black, revealed that of thirty-three mandatorily shared kid-
only one was transplanted into a black recipient.89 Hunsicker and 
have estimated that mandatory national sharing of all kidneys 
no HLA mismatches would result in a maximum of eight percent 
to black recipients and would reduce the total number of kidneys 
ble to black patients by three percent. 90 
C. The Disappearing Benefits of Matching 
Given the inherent disparate racial impact of the UNOS antigen 
-u;ning policies, the desirability of antigen matching turns crucially 
the degree to which matching enhances the probability of transplant 
;h·al.11 This section takes up this question and makes four stylized 
us10ns: 
(1) Independent of any effect of antigen matching, black kidney 
pients have lower survival rates than white recipients; 
a waiting list with blacks making up 42 percent, the UNOS point system ranked 
tes so that 37 percent of the highest ranked potential recipients was black, the ROBI 
41 percent. When the donor was a non·black, 33 and 39 percent of the highest ranked 
nt& were black for the UNOS and ROBI protocols respectively. 
Dtnnis notes, however, that it is dHficult to assess the national effect of antigen matching on 
reopients because several OPOs have variances that deemphasize antigen matching. 
Terasaki, Takemoto, and Mickey, 3 Clinical Transplantation at 303 (cited in note 58). 
~Takemoto, et al., 327 New Eng. J . Med. 834 (cited in note 25). This percentage still is 
than the proportion of cadaveric kidneys donated by blacks-approximately eight per-
-perhaps because the distribution of antigens among blacks is more heterogenous than 
whites. 
Bruce Barger, et al., The Impact of the UNOS Mandatory Sharing Policy on Recipients 
BltJclr and White Races-Experience at a Single Renal Transplant Center, 53 Transplanta-
070 (1992). 
Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28). 
1 Antigen matching might also enhance patient survival. However, numerous studies have 
DO tatistically significant correlation between either race or antigen matching on the mor-
rate of transplant recipients. See, for example, Jane Galton, Racial Effect on Kidney Trans-
lOn, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Kidney Transplants 1985 153 (U.C.L.A. Tissue 
Laboratory, 1985); H. Krakauer, et al., The Recent U.S. Experience in the Treatment of 
Oil' Renal Disease By D1alysis and Transplantation, 308 New Eng. J. Med. 1558 (1983). 
analvsis of the benefits of antigen matching accordingly focuses on its effects on graft survival. 
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(2) Six antigen matches may improve transplant survival signifi-
cantly-by approximately ten percent; 
(3) Matching fewer than six antigens has a much less pronounced 
effect on allograft survival for white recipients and no reliable effect on 
survival rates for black recipients;12 and 
( 4) The use of new immunosuppressant drug therapies is likely to 
reduce further the positive correlation between quality of antigen 
matching and graft survival. 
An ancillary goal of the section is to convey the degree to which these 
empirical conclusions are contested and contingent upon rapidly chang-
ing statistical samples. The advent of new drug technologies and new 
allocation point systems in particular necessitates reevaluating new co-
horts of transplantation recipients. 
1. Racial Differences in Transplant Survival 
Early analysis of survival rates for kidney transplantation did not 
mention race as a determinant of graft outcome.83 In 1977, however, 
investigators from the U.C.L.A. Kidney Transplant Registry first noted 
that cadaveric graft survival at both one and three years was ten per-
cent lower for black transplant recipients than for whites.94 Although 
some single center studies in those early years showed no racial differ-
ences in graft survival,911 other single center studies" and larger mul-
ticenter data111 consistently documented an eight percent to twelve 
percent advantage in graft survival for white recipients.118 
92. In fact, the recent article by Takemoto and colleagues implicitly supports this by com-
paring the success of six-antigen matches to all lesser matches as a group. See Takemoto, et al., 
327 New Eng. J . Med. 834 (cited in note 25). 
93. See, for example, Advisory Committee to the Renal Transplant Registry, The Thirteenth 
Report of the Human Renal Tran&plant Registry, 9 Transplantation Proc. 9 (1977). 
94. G. Opelz, M. K. Mickey and P. I. Terasaki, Influence of Race on Kidney Tran&plont 
Survi110l, 9 Transplantation Proc. 137 (1977). 
95. See, for example, Paul J. Garvin, et al., Recipient Race as a Risk Factor in Renal Traru· 
plantation, 118 Arch. Surg. 1441 (1983); Arthur J. Matas, et al., Does Race Affect Renal Tran&· 
plant Results?: A Single lnstitut1on Study, 1 Clinical Transplantation 261 (1987); Vijay K. Mittal, 
et al., Influence of Race on Cadaveric Kidney Tran&plantation, 11 Dialysis & Transplantation 960 
(1982). 
96. See Bruce 0 . Barger, et al., Influence of Race on Renal Allograft Survival in the Pre-
and Postcyclosporine Era, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1987 217 (U.C.L.A. Tissue 
Typing Laboratory, 1987); Frank P. Stuart, et al., Race as a Risk Factor in Cadaver Kidney 
Transplantation, 114 Arch. Surg. 416 (1979). 
97. See, for example, J. Michael Cecka, The Roles of Sex, Race, and ABO Groups, in Paull. 
Terasaki, ed., Clmical Transplants 1986 199 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1986); Galton, 
Racial Effect on Kidney Transplantation, in Clinical Kidney Transplants 1985 153 (cited in note 
91); Rafael Oriol, Jacques Le Pendu, and Calvin Chun, Influence of the Original Disease, Race, 
and Center on the Outcome of Kidney Transplantation, 33 Transplantation 22 (1982). 
98. These results can be summarized: 
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The introduction of the drug cyclosporine as an immunosuppres-
therapy in 1983-1984 dramatically increased the one-year survival 
of kidney transplants and raised hopes of diminishing racial differ-
in graft survival. Again, small single-center reports suggested no 
difference at one year in survival of first cadaveric transplants 
showed vastly superior overall results using cyclosporine-based pro-
_._._ .. Multicenter data, however, while confirming improved graft 
rat, have continued to show a racial effect of eight to eleven per-
See Table 4. 
TABLE 4. ONE YEAR GRAFT SURVIVAL IN PRIMARY CADAVERIC 
TRANSPLANTS BY RACE IN CYCLOSPORINE-TREATED PATIENTS 
YRS of Study 
83-85 
84-87 
83-86 
No. Transplants 
2190 
6655 
437 
Graft Survival 
White (N) Black (N) 
77% (1944) 66% (246) 
77% (5126) 68% (1529) 
76% (256) 60% (181) 
term graft survival also varies with race: the half-life of kidney 
•••~~q>Iants in black recipients has been found to be as much as fifty 
.. _,r.rat shorter than for white recipients-four and eight years respec-
&All GRAFT SURVIVAL IN PRIMARY CADAVERIC TRANSPLANTS BY RACE IN PATIENTS TREATED 
WITH AZATHIOPRINE-PREDNISONE 
Years of Study 
1970-75 
1970-79 
1977-80 
No. of Transplants 
4559 
10,802 
7202 
Graft Survival 
White (N) 
47% (3581) 
48% (7984) 
58% (5558) 
Black (N) 
37% (978) 
36% (2129) 
50% (1624). 
ey, and Terasaki, 9 Transplantation Proc. 137 (cited in note 94); Oriol, Le Pendu, and 
Transplantation 22 (cited in note 97); Krakauer, et al., 308 New Eng. J . Med. 1558 (cited 
1). 
See Matas, et al., 1 Clinical Transplantation 261 (cited in note 95); H. J. Ward, et al., 
of Renal TraMplantation in Blacks, 19 Transplantation Proc. 1546 (1987). A recent 
-.iic:ates, however, that cyclosporine may not enhance long-term survival of kidney trans-
Tbe half-life of transplants in the cyclosporine and the precyclosporine eras were not statis-
erent-7.2 and 6.9 years respectively. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited 
%5). 
<Acka, The Roles of Sex., Race, and ABO Groups, in Clinical Transplants 1986 199 
DOte 97). 
Kazunori Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney TraMp/ants, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., 
TroMp/ants 1987 339 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1987). 
Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in note 89). See also G. Opelz, et al., Kid-
t uruiual Rates in Black Cyclosporine-Treated Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 
(finding that the three-year survival rates for black and white cadaveric kidney recipi-
60% and 70%, respectively). 
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tively.103 These differences in both one-year graft survival and half-life 
are depicted in Figure 1.1 04 
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Several explanations have been proposed for this racial disparity in 
graft survival, including racial differences in (1) original kidney disease 
and recurrence rate/0 & (2) the quality of antigen matching/08 
(3) t he quality of the transplanting center,107 (4) patient 
103. S. Takemoto and P. I. Terasaki, A Comparison of Kidney Transplant Survival in 
White and Black Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3865 (1989); Joyce Yuge and J. M. Cecka, 
The Race Effect, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1989 407 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing 
Laboratory, 1989). 
104. Reproduced by permission from Paul Terasaki, et al., Long Term Survival of Kidney 
Grafts, 21 Transplantation Proc. 615, 616 (1989). 
105. It has been suggested that high blood pressure as a cause of kidney failure might also be 
associated with poorer transplant outoomes. Oriol, Le Pendu, and Chun, 33 Transplantation 22 
(cited in note 97). Under this theory blacks might have lower transplant survival rates because 
they are six times as likely as whites to have hypertension as the cause of ESRD. Subsequent 
series have failed to offer support for this original disease hypothesis as a major factor. See Galton, 
Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Kidney Transplants 1985 153 (cited in note 97). 
106. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 79-83, blacks are less likely to receive kid-
neys with equally well-matched antigens. A poorer average antigen match might contribute to 
poorer survival rates. See Kondo, et. al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Trans· 
plants 1987 339 (cited in note 101); Opelz, et al., 21 Transplantation Proc. 3918 (cited in note 102). 
107. Some authors have argued that black survival rates are lower because black recipients 
tend to have their operations performed at "poor" transplant centers. Sondra T . Perdue and Paul 
I. Terasaki, Analysis of Interracial Variation in Kidney Transplant and Patient Survival, 34 
Transplantation 75, 75 (1982) (saying that "Negro recipients appear to have essentially the same 
graft and patient survival rates as Caucasian recipients after analyzing for the center effect"). The 
cause of widely divergent results across centers is the subject of ongoing investigation. R. W. Ev-
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•••pliance, 101 and (5) immunologic responsiveness.1011 No consensus 
__ ._.however, regarding the validity and relative importance of these 
though black patients receive kidneys with poorer antigen 
••ldiW:Ite than white recipients, 110 the racial disparity in survival rates 
even among patients receiving kidneys with equally well-
antigens. A recent multivariate regression analysis indicates 
..... 8ft8 controlling for ten other factors-including the degree of an-
matching-black recipients of white kidneys have a twenty-five 
••~·t greater risk of graft failure than white recipients of white kid-
.... .._.:n With this historical baseline of a significant racial disparity in 
b.nninen, and F. Dong, The Center Effect in Kidney Transplantation, 23 Transplan-
1315 (1991). 
• .utiatical matter, however, the direction of causality has proven extremely difficult to 
.. ._ .... r.: do black.s have poorer survival rates because they receive transplants at poor centers, or 
centers have poorer survival rates because they perform more transplants on blacks? A 
••• npart from the U.C.L.A. registry attributes 4.6"1o of the 11 "'o racial disparity in one year 
the center effect. Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical 
.~ ... I!IIIJp(an.fl 1987 339 (cited in note 101). 
Two recent studies have indicated that black allograft recipients are less likely than 
ent.s to comply with prescribed drug therapies. R. H. Didlake, et al., Patient Non-
.. ..,~~IC•t A Major Cause of Late Graft Failure in Cyclosporine-Treated Renal Transplants, 
t'n•plantation Proc. 63 (Supp. 3 1988) (saying that blacks, comprising 20.7"1o of the trans-
,cpulation, accounted for 70% of noncompliant graft failures); Mary Rove IIi, et al., Noncom-
... -~. an Organ Transplant Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 833 (1989) (finding a 
.... !I!I!I.P.iance rate of 30% in blacks and 12% in whites). See also Donald E. Butkus, Edward F. 
·1-~ndbi. and Seshadri S. Raju, Racial Differences in the Survival of Cadaveric Renal Al-
.j-~b-<kf'rriding Effects of HLA Matching and Socioeconomic Factors, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 
When these data were reanalyzed, however, there appeared to be no racial differences 
~-- IOCioeconomic strata (blacks were overrepresented in the lower income category). M . 
........ et al., Noncompliance in Renal Transplant Recipients: Evaluation by Socioeconomic 
••--.:~r. 21 T ransplantation Proc. 3979 (1989). A higher rate of noncompliance among black recipi-
be caused by a host of socioeconomic factors-poverty, inadequate education, and the 
_,_..-~an mi&ht also be an artifact of the center effect, discussed in note 107, if inferior resources 
to their convalescent therapy. 
Recent studies have indicated that lower kidney survival rates for blacks might be at-
•!l!ll:able to a tendency for blacks to have a stronger immune response to grafts than whites. R. H . 
• .._.~~~., et al., Stronger Immune Responsiveness of Blacks us. Whites May Account for Renal 
_...,r~;t -urt:wal Differences, 23 Transplantation Proc. 380 (1991); R. H. Kerman, et al., Possible 
..... -.oo::.:x..t1on of ?retransplant Immune Responder Status to Renal Allograft Survival Differences 
Versus White Recipients, 21 Transplantation 338 (1991); R. H. Kennan, et al., Influence 
Crossmatch Outcome and Recipient Eligibility for Transplantation, 53 Transplanta-
1992). 
See notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
John M. Weller, et al., Influence of Race of Cadaveric Kidney Donor and Recipient on 
llt'al: A Multifactorial Analysis, 9 Am. J . Kidney Diseases 191 (1987). See also G. Opelz 
Engelmann, Effect of HLA Matching in Cyclosporine-Treated Black Kidney Transplant 
_,'-"C>" . 21 Transplantation Proc. 3881 (1989); Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in 
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graft survival, we now consider the incremental effects of antigen 
matching. 
2. The Benefits of Six-Antigen Matching 
Empirical evidence indicates that recipients of six-antigen-matched 
kidneys experience significantly improved graft survival. An analysis of 
more than 500 kidneys transplanted since 1987 under the UNOS 
mandatory sharing policy of six-antigen-matched kidneys indicates one-
year survival rates of eighty-seven percent--a ten percent improvement 
over nonmatched survival.111 These results are particularly striking be-
cause transplants occurred at more than sixty centers, with varying de-
grees of quality, and some of the donor kidneys were preserved for 
longer periods of time as required to transport them across the 
nation.111 
There is more tentative evidence that transplants with zero mis-
matches have enhanced survival. As discussed, 114 antigen typing might 
not reveal two different antigens on each of the A, B, and DR loci. A 
typing blank can result either because the existing sera fail to detect 
existing antigens, or because the tissue is homozygotic, meaning that its 
locus expresses two antigens of the same type. 116 If a blank results be-
cause the donor is homozygotic, then zero-mismatched transplants 
might have the enhanced survival characteristics of six-antigen-
matched transplants. An initial analysis of forty-two zero-mismatched 
transplants tentatively found one- and two-year survival rates to be no 
different from those for six-antigen-matched recipients.118 These data 
are particularly relevant to the recent UNOS amendment that extended 
112. S. Takemoto, E. Carnahan and P. I. Terasaki, A Report of 504 Six Antigen-Matched 
Troruplont1, 23 Transplantation Proc. 1318 (1991). To control for the po68ibility of enhanced kid-
ney quality, this U.C.L.A. registry study also reported the survival rates of the other donated (con-
tralateral) kidney if one was harvested. The enhanced rate of survival from six-antigen matching is 
reflected in second year statistics as weU: 
Type of Tran plant 
6 Antigen 
Contralateral 
Survival Rate 
1 YeBJ 
87.2 
75.8 
2 Year 
79.8 
69.6 
The effecta of six-antigen matching were statistically insignificant (P < .05) See also 
Takemoto, et al., 327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (cited in note 25). 
113. Terasaki, Takemoto and Mickey, 3 Clinical TransplantatiOn at 304 (cited in note 58) 
(saying that "(a]pparently harvest techniques and storage methods have now been worked out 
sufficiently well to yield uniform high survival rates that are almost independent of harvesting 
center"). 
114. See note 49. 
115. A child'• locus wiiJ be homozygotic ii each parent contributed the same antigen to the 
locus. 
116. Takemoto, Carnahan, and Terasaki, 23 Transplantation Proc. 1318 (cited in note 112). 
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national mandatory sharing to this wider class of zero-mismatched 
transplants.117 
Six-antigen matching-and possibly zero-antigen mis-
matching-thus significantly enhances kidney transplant survival. Yet 
u the foregoing analysis indicated,118 these well-matched kidneys goal-
most exclusively to white recipients. Fewer than four percent of these 
mandatorily shared kidneys now go to black recipients, 118 and at least 
one major center has never received a six-antigen-matched kidney for a 
black recipient.120 Thus, although the mandatory sharing policy has 
been successful for the predominantly white recipients lucky enough to 
receive six-antigen-matched kidneys, black candidates have not shared 
in its benefits. 
3. The Attenuated Benefits of Partial Antigen Matching 
When one or more antigens are mismatched, there is a much 
weaker correlation between the quality of matching and transplant sur-
\ival. In a single center report, 111 while whites and blacks had different 
urvival rates, matching for one or more antigens did not make a statis-
tically significant difference in patient or graft survival at one, two, or 
three years for either white or black recipients when compared to trans-
plants with no matched antigens.122 In multivariate analysis of data 
from Michigan, 123 the presence of three or four antigen mismatches on 
the A and B loci did not increase risk of graft loss. u• A recent analysis 
of national data indicates that the marginal impact on graft survival of 
an additional antigen mismatch is greater at the zero end of the scale 
compared to six mismatches.12& Graft survival increases more signifi-
cantly when comparing a change from one to zero mismatches than 
when comparing six to five mismatches.126 
A recent article by Hunsicker and Held concludes that recipients of 
zero-antigen-mismatched kidneys receive most of the benefit from 
117. See text accompanying notes 54-58. 
118. See text accompanying notes 87-90. 
119. Hunsicker and Held, 12 SeminllrS in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28). 
120. Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in note 89). 
121. S. M. Greenstein, et al., Does Kidney Distribution Based Upon HLA Matching Dis· 
cnminate Against Blacks, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3874 (1989). 
122. ld. 
123. Weller, et al., 9 Am. J. Kidney Diseases 191 (cited in note 111). 
124. ld. at 193. The results of this Michigan study are partially contradicted by an Alabama 
atudy indicating that matching at least one antigen on both the A and B loci can enhance one- and 
two-year graft survival by 10%. Barger, et al., Influence of Race on Renal Allograft Survival, in 
Cimical Transplants 1987 217 (cited in note 96). 
125. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28). 
126. Thus, the study concludes that the aggregate impact on graft survival of a change in the 
average mismatches depends crucially upon where on the mismatch scale the change occurs. ld. 
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matching, though recipients of single-antigen-mismatched kidneys may 
also realize some benefit. 127 They found that cadaveric renal transplan-
tation with lesser degrees of matching offered very little gain at all.128 
Indeed, USRDS data demonstrate no statistical relationship of HLA 
matching to survival of first allografts at five years in the presence of 
even one or more mismatches. 121 
The data on the effects of partial matching are, however, not mono-
lithic. Multicenter data from the U.C.L.A. Transplant Registry and the 
Collaborative Transplant Study continue to describe marginal improve-
ments in graft survival with improved matching. 110 A recent analysis 
conducted by the U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory finds that the 
half-life of kidney transplants tends to increase with better antigen 
matching, but says that this improvement-from 7.2 to 9.4 
years-occurs only if there are no mismatches on either the A or the B 
locus,181 again suggesting that the most dramatic benefit occurs only 
with extremely well-matched transplants. 
A clearer picture emerges, however, when analyzing the effects of 
partial matching on graft survival for black transplant recipients: there 
is virtually no correlation between partial matching and graft survival 
in black recipients. Two studies from the University of Alabama, which 
performs a large number of t ransplants for black recipients, concluded 
that partial antigen matching did not improve black patients' chances 
of graft survival.131 Three recent reviews from the U.C.L.A. registry 
failed to note any relationship between cadaveric allograft survival in 
blacks and antigen matching.m Although an article from the Collabora-
tive Transplant Study reported a marginal positive effect of antigen 
matching, the authors concluded: " [T]he lack of a matching effect in 
127. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28). 
128. Id. T he authors also conclude: "The most recent UNOS/UCLA data also show a sub-
stantial decrease in t he long-term benefits of matching with as few as one mismatched antigen." 
Id. at 298. 
129. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28). 
130. David W. Gjertson, Short· and Long-Term Effects of HLA Matching, in Paul I. Ter-
asaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1989 353 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1989); Gerhard 
Opelz, In Response to 'The Role of HLA Matching in Renal Transplant Patients with Sequential 
Immunosuppression', 3 Clinical Transplantation 233 (1989). 
131. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. at 1033-34 (cited in note 25). See also Takemoto, 
et al., 327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (cited in note 25). 
132. Barger, Influence of Race on Renal Allcgraft Survival in the Pre- and Postcyclcsporine 
Era, in Clinical Transplants 1987 at 229 (cited in note 96) (saying t hat, for example, one year 
allograft survivals for DR matched and nonmatched black recipients were 59% and 62% respec-
tively). See also Gaston, et al., 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83) (finding no beneficial 
effect of antigen matching on graft survival for black recipients). 
133. Yuge and Cecka, The Race Effect, in Clmical Transplcnts 1989 407 (cited in note 103); 
Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Transplants 1987 339 (cited in 
note 101); Takemoto, Carnahan and Terasaki, 23 Transplantation Proc. 1318 (cited in note 112). 
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•• refiects both poorer understanding of HLA antigens m blacks 
_.,.Lf',ate distribution between races. "134 
absence of an antigen matching effect for black recipients of 
kidneys is likely an artifact of the imprecise nature of antigen 
••~-o The immunologic response of the recipient is actually controlled 
pnetic level-that is, by the particular sequencing of DNA-and 
crudely captured by the current antigen typing method. 1u Anti-
tching serves as a proxy for the underlying genetic compatibility 
directly controls the recipient's immune response. Antigen match-
)! be a better proxy for the underlying genetic compatibility when 
donors are giving to white recipients. The reduced value of anti-
.. tching for black recipients of a largely white donor population is 
-•quently less surprising because the underlying genetic material 
DOt correlate as well across race. 
In um, the evidence supporting a positive correlation between 
survival and partial antigen matching is dramatically weaker than 
-antigen matching. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence 
-- to suggest that partial antigen matching does not enhance trans-
uccess for black recipients. The latter result is particularly im-
-r1UI'"t because black recipients, as a practical matter, have access to 
than fully matched kidneys. u& 
4. The Impact of New Immunosuppressant Drug Therapies 
The empirical analyses of the preceding sections-concerning both 
racial disparity in graft survival and the impact of antigen matching 
craft survival-were based on data accumulated during the 
osporine era." This potent immunosuppressive agent, introduced 
the United States in 1983, revolutionized transplantation with 
ked improvements in outcomes compared to previous therapies. 
er advances in immunosuppression are occurring at a dizzying 
These improved therapies are likely to have a significant impact 
both antigen matching and racial differences in graft survival. For 
Opelz, et al., 21 Transplantation Proc. 3918 (cited in note 102) (finding enhanced one-
,raft survival for zero mismatches on the DR locus on the order of five percent). 
35- See notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
The implications of these results have not been lost on the transplant community: 
• realize the greatest benefit from scarce cadaver kidneys, it may be appropriate to en-
e transplants that have a distinctly superior success rate, such as 6-Ag [antigen] match 
lants. However, it is difficult to justify giving a kidney to a patient who has been on the 
..rung list for a short time while denying it to another who may have waited for years, 
~Y because of a supposedly better match, the value of which has not been demonstrated 
continues to be disputed. 
Greenstein, et al., Does Kidney Distribution Based Upon HLA Matching Discriminate 
t Blacks?, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3874, 3875 (1989). 
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«UaJDIMew at the University of Alabama, which for twenty years had ex-
pelimced eicbt percent to nineteen percent poorer graft survival in 
black reapienta, the use of a modified drug regimen known as "quadru-
ple therapy" has completely abrogated racial disparity in graft survival 
since ita introduction in 1987.137 In this series of 642 patients, there also 
was no impact of HLA matching on graft survival in blacks and only 
minimal effects of improved matching in whites. 
TABLE 5. GRAFT SURVIVAL AT ONE YEAR118 
Recipient Race 
Black 
White 
Standard (N = 276) 
54% (112) 
74% (164) 
Quad (N=366) 
76% (180) 
73% (186). 
The parity in survival rates induced by quadruple therapy was evident 
for periods of at least three years. 
STANDARD THERAPY 
100 
80 
-
60 a:s 
> 
·:;: 
.... 
::s 40 00 
~ 
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0 
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 
Months Posttransplant 
137. Gaston, et al., 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83). 
138. Id. (reproduced with permission). 
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With quadruple immunosuppression, a potent anti-rejection agent 
known as Minnesota anti-lymphoblast globulin (MALG) is added 
prophylactically to standard cyclosporine-based therapy.189 Improve-
ment in graft survival for black recipients with this regimen has also 
been documented in a recent review of data from several centers.140 The 
experience of several transplant centers has shown that with quadruple 
therapy, all recipients-white and black-achieve success rates rivalling 
those usually associated with six-antigen matches regardless of antigen 
matching.141 Available evidence thus suggests that with quadruple ther-
apy neither race nor quality of antigen matching predicts graft survival. 
Of potentially greater significance are new drugs on the horizon, 
which appear to offer more potent immunosuppression, fewer rejec-
139. Standard therapy is known as "triple drug" therapy, using cyclosporine along with 
azathioprine and prednisone in what is thought to be a beneficial combination. Hence, the addition 
of MALG becomes "quadruple therapy." Quadruple therapy is synonymous with "sequential ther-
apy." MALG is itself an antibody, extracted from horses, that is u ed to attack the lymphocytes of 
the recipient that initiate a response to o nonmatching antigen of the transplanted kidney. By 
attacking the cells that initiate the recipient's immune response, MALG may enhance graft 
survival. 
140. Donald E. Butkua, Prirrwry Renal Cadaveric Allograft Suruiual m Blacks-Is There 
~till a Significant D1{ference?, 5 Transplant Rev. 91 (1991). 
141. Ronald M. Ferguson, A Multlcenter E:xpenence with Sequential ALG/Cyclosporine 
Therapy 1n Renal Transplantation , 2 Climcal Transplantation 285 (1988). 
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tions, and less toxicity. 141 These drugs include FK-506, which is ex-
tremely effective in liver transplantation and is currently undergoing 
trials in kidney recipients;141 RS-61443, a new agent of high efficacy 
with few side effects in preliminary clinical trials at the Universities of 
Wisconsin and Alabama;1H and rapamycin, which is still in animal tri-
als.141 It seems likely that the continued development and use of these 
new immunosuppressant therapies has the potential to further enhance 
graft survival in patients of all races.14' In short, the new therapies hold 
the promise of reducing the importance of both race and antigen 
matching as determinants of transplant outcomes. 
III. TRAGIC CHOICES 
With these stylized facts as a backdrop, we now discuss the difficult 
policy choices concerning the procurement and allocation of cadaveric 
kidneys. The choices that society makes concerning the disparate racial 
impact of antigen matching in the end are of the same nature that 
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt labeled "tragic."147 The optimal 
rules for procuring and allocating cadaveric kidneys depend not only on 
social norms, but on judgments about the empirical issues raised above. 
Ultimately, the absence of clear empirical results may make the alloca-
tion of burdens of proof the most important normative decision of all. 
This Part begins by analyzing two of the "cleanest" normative 
objectives of allocation: maximizing transplant survival and minimizing 
medical cost. We argue that both objectives ultimately lead to alloca-
142. Like MALG, many of these agents are antibodies designed to attack the recipient's lym-
phocytes and thus suppress the recipient's immune response. MALG is a nonspecific "polyclonal" 
antibody that attacks a broad range of lymphocytes. Unlike MALG, however, many of the new 
immunosuppressants are "monoclonal": more specifically targeted to suppress only those lympho-
cytes that would reject transplanted tissues. OKT3, for eu.mple, is a monoclonal antibody that 
targets only "T cells" for attack. Newer monoclonal antibodies may be even more selective, attack-
ing only T cells that are actively participating in the rejection response. Gideon Goldstein, 
Monoclonal Antibody Specificity: Orthoclone OKT3 T·Cell Blocker, 46 Nephron 5 (Supp. 1 1987). 
See also N. Tolkoff-Rubin, et al., lmmunosuppre81ion With Anti-ICAM-1 (CD54) Monoclonal 
Antibody in Renal Allograft Recipients, 2 J . Am. Soc. Nephrology 820 (1991). 
143. See A. M. Macleod and A. W. Thomson, FK506: An Immunosuppressant {or the 1990s?, 
337 Lancet 25 (1991); R. Shapiro, et al, Kidnej Transplantation Under FK 506 lmmunosuppres· 
sion, 23 Transplantation Proc. 920 (1991). 
144. Hans W. Sollinger, et al., RS-61443: Phase I Climcal Trial and Pilot Rescue Study, 53 
Transplantation 428 (1992). 
145. J . Wang, et al., Initial Use of Rapamycin Immunosuppression in Nonhuman Primate 
Graft Recipients, Am. Soc. of Transplant Surgeons, 17th Annual Scientific Meeting 49 (May 1991). 
See also Kozo Tamura, et al., 15-Deoxyspergualin (DSPJ 'Rescue Therapy' Against Methyl-
predniSolone (MPSI)· Resistant Rejection of Renal Transplants as Compared with Anti·T Cell 
Monoclonal Antibody (0KT3) , 2 J. Am. Soc. Nephrololgy 819 (1991). 
146. Whether the new therapies will negate the 10% improvement in survival associated with 
six-antigen matching remains to be determined. 
147. Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Cho1ces at 19 (cited in note 24). 
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•~•llllllua that would be subjectively unpalatable in our society. This 
to consider more complicated accommodations between equity 
•aency. We propose a range of allocation alternatives that fur-
more amorphous goals under both current and future immu-
••pnua t technologies. Finally, we analyze the political history of 
-. ... allocation in the United States and situate our proposal within 
nt debate. 
A. The Limits of Two Simple Objectives 
straightforward objective in allocating the increasingly scarce 
... , of cadaveric kidneys would be to maximize transplant survival. 
maximization furthers one notion of egalitarianism: 
ting differently patients in whom the kidney would work from 
m whom it would not amounted to treating people equally who 
relevantly equal, and discriminating between those groups which 
relevantly unequal. "148 This objective would lead to the mandatory 
••IIW of six-antigen-matched kidneys. As discussed/'" the survival 
oC these kidneys are approximately ten percent better than those 
well-matched kidneys. In addition, maximizing survival rates 
•• also require awarding some preference-at least for whites-to 
antigen matching when the evidence also indicates improved 
.. ~es. 
·e argue, however, that maximum survival is normatively an in-
•IIPiete objective because it would lead to the nearly complete exclu-
of blacks from kidney transplantation. The evidence from multiple 
•dils is that black kidney recipients have uniformly lower survival 
than similarly situated whites.160 Our belief that the wholesale ex-
•-.cm of blacks would be rejected by society depends on the relatively 
ize of racial disparity in graft survival.161 If graft survival in 
ld. at 24-25. 
~ text accompanying note 112. 
See text accompanying note 94. While some of this statistical correlation may result 
• tendency for blacks to receive kidneys from inferior transplantation centers, the "center 
ha not been able to explain all of the racial disparity. See note 107. 
1 A pure survival maximization objective would not necessarily exclude all blacks from 
_ ... mtation, but more precisely would call for a lexicographic system of allocation in which 
received kidneys only if white recipients were unavailable. Empirically, however, the num-
ttl potential white recipients would effectively preclude transplantation to blacks under this 
survival marimiz.ation might even preclude blacks from receiving the cadaveric kidneys 
donors given the perverse empirical finding that black recipients of black kidneys do not 
eahanced survival rates. See Opelz, Mickey, and Terasaki, 9 Transplantation Proc. 137 (cited 
94); Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Climcal Transplants 1987 339 
m note 101); Harry J. Ward and Martin A. Koyle, The Beneficial Effect of Blood Transfu-
and the DR 1 Gene Dose on Renal Transplant Outcome in Blacks, 51 Transplantation 359 
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black recipients approached zero percent in the first year, the racial ba-
sis for exclusion might be tolerable.162 Yet, the historical disparity of 
eight percent to eleven percent in first year survival rates does not seem 
sufficiently high to warrant complete exclusion of blacks from the recip-
ient pool. 168 
Indeed, the generic normative question is how large must the dis-
count be? If according to the cyclosporine era statistics white recipients 
have a seventy-seven percent first year survival rate, how much lower 
must the rate for black recipients be before they are disfavored in the 
allocation process? Survival maximization yields the straightforward 
answer that any reliable discount is sufficient for racial exclusion, but 
this simplicity comes at the sacrifice of other normative values. Our 
point here is a small one. The social unacceptability of wholesale exclu-
sion of blacks from the transplantation process is strong evidence that 
our objectives must go beyond simple survival maximization. 
A similar analysis applies to arguments that society should mini-
mize the costs of transplantation.1M A recent article, for example, ar-
gues for a mandatory national system of partial antigen matching, in 
part because the authors claim that national matching would save the 
government $6.5 million a year.1611 Their basic argument is that the ad-
ditional costs of a national matching system-estimated to be $1000 per 
transplant-are outweighed by savings that result from higher survival 
rates.168 This type of cost savings, however, clearly is not the sole deter-
minant of our allocation system. The authors' own analysis indicates 
that the use of cyclosporine increases the cost of transplantation. Even 
though kidney failure necessitates a costly operation to remove the 
graft and return to dialysis, the cost savings induced by higher survival 
rates with cyclosporine are more than offset by the costs of the drug 
(1991). Wholesale exclusion of blacks from transplantation is even supported by an analysis of 
patient survival because, again perversely, blacks tend to have a slightly lower mortality rate on 
dialysis than whites. See Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in note 89). 
152. After all, the exclusion of blood type B recipients from the pool of blood type A cadav-
eric donations is not problematic given the zero success rates for such transplantation. 
153. This analysis could of course proceed upon other measures of survival, each of which 
itself involves an implicit normative choice. For example, the racial disparity in transplant half-life 
may be on the order of 50%. See text accompanying note 103. 
154. Cost-benefit analysis often is determined by the initial assumptions of what costs and 
what benefits count. See John J . Donohue IlJ and Jan Ayres, Posner's Symphony No. 3, 39 Stan. 
L. Rev. 791 (1987). 
155. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25). 
156. Transplant failure necessitates the removal of the graft, which the authors estimated to 
cost approximately $10,000, and the return to dialysis, estimated to cost $17,000 per year. Elevated 
survival rates can reduce the government's expenditures because the government spends only 
$8000 per year on cyclosporine therapy for successful transplants after the first-year of treatment. 
Id. at 1035. 
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iaaelf. Yet, it is hard to imagine that we would eliminate the use of this 
nderdrug" that enhances survival rates by ten percent to twenty 
percent. 
The normatively unacceptable nature of this type of cost calcula-
bOD is even more striking, however, when extended to issues of race. 
The exclusion of blacks from the pool of cadaveric transplants would 
ve the government even more money than a mandatory national pro-
pam of partial antigen matching. Extending the analysis of this article, 
estimate that the expected present value of government expendi-
lures for a transplant are $98,300 for a black recipient and $90,700 for a 
white recipient.1117 Reallocating to whites the approximately 1400 cadav-
eric kidneys that currently go to black recipients would consequently 
ve the government more than $10.6 million per year.1111 
Again our normative conclusion is a limited one. Both pure cost 
minimization and survival maximization objectives would lead to nor-
matively unacceptable results such as explicit racial exclusions. Conse-
quently, one cannot defend or justify other allocative choices by 
analyzing these objectives alone. In short, we believe that our society 
holds these objectives to be morally incomplete. Our argument is not 
that these objectives are unimportant, but only that our society tempers 
them with equitable concerns, among them, that government actions 
should not burden traditionally disadvantaged races.1118 
Two aspects of the current UNOS point system-the 0 kidney rule 
and the presensitization points-provide especially powerful examples 
of how the current allocation system rejects a single-minded emphasis 
on survival. As analyzed above, 110 the 0 rule prohibits the transplanta-
tion of kidneys from 0 blood type donors into recipients of other blood 
types unless there is a six-antigen match.111 Even though the 0 blood 
type organs could be transplanted into recipients with A or B blood 
types, the guidelines reflect a concern that without this prohibition the 
0 blood type recipients would inequitably have to share the pool of 0 
kidneys with too many other recipients. The 0 rule is an example of 
157. For assumptions underlying this calculation, see note 156. In addition, the authors esti-
mated that the transplantation costa $35,000 and that first year treatment (including cyclosporine) 
ta $20,000. ld. To capture the racial difference in survival rates, we have assumed hazard rates 
C whites of 20% in the first year and 6% per year thereafter, and for blacks of 28% in the first 
fNl and 11% per year thereafter. See G. Opelz, et al., Kidney Graft Survival Rates in Black 
C~closporine-Treated Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3918 (1989). 
158. 1400 X (98.3 • 90.7) - 10,640. 
159. This ia what Calabresi and Bobbitt referred to as "corrected egalitarianism." See text 
accompanying note 24. J . Michael Dennis refers to this value as "sociological justice." J. Michael 
Dtnnis, 6 Transplantation Rev. 130 (cited in note 60). See also W. B. Amason, Directed Donation: 
The Relevance of Race, 21 Hastings Center Report 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1991). 
160. See text accompanying note 73. 
161. UNOS Policy § 3.4 (1992). 
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equity trumping efficiency because it potentially favors an 0 blood type 
recipient with a zero-antigen match over a B blood type recipient with a 
five-antigen match. This interplay between equity and efficiency has, 
however, a perverse racial dimension. The 0 rule favors 0 blood type 
recipients over the predominantly black B blood type recipients and 
thus exacerbates the unequal access of blacks to transplantation.112 
Society's willingness to privilege equitable concerns over a simple 
interest in graft survival is also exemplified by presensitization points. 
The UNOS system currently awards points to candidates whose blood 
contains antibodies against more than eighty percent of potential ca-
daveric donations. 115 Presensitization lowers a candidate's chance of 
successful transplantation because the recipient's immune system has 
already produced antibodies to attack a wide array of foreign tissue.114 
The limited goal of graft survival would cause presensitized candidates 
to receive negative points in an allocation system. However, because 
presensitized candidates "can wait three or more years for transplant, 
they have attracted a near-universal sympathy for their plight."115 
J. Michael Dennis characterizes the treatment of presensitized can-
didates as consistent with the goal of medical justice: " 'Medical justice' 
is a principle based on compassion for patients with 'medical bad luck.' 
Because of their medical condition, these patients have a less-than-av-
erage chance to receive treatment. Medical justice dictates that they be 
given allocative preference."111 This does not account for the major 
cause of presensitization: the failure of an initial transplant. When ini-
tial transplantations fail, the recipient's body often produces massive 
numbers of antibodies that presensitize the recipient against further 
transplantation. The allocative preference for presensitized candidates 
thus has the perverse effect of rewarding candidates who often already 
had the opportunity for transplantation. In economic terms, the "medi-
cal bad luck" is not completely exogenous. 
162. As analyzed above in notes 73-76 and accompanying text, the 0 rule disadvantages 
predominantly white A recipients and predominantly black B recipients. A recipients may draw 
from a disproportionately large pool of donated A kidneys in comparison with the pool of donated 
B kidneys available to B recipients and therefore are not affected as much as B recipients by the 
removal of 0 type transplants. A differential equation model of donation and ESRD rates suggests 
that the advantage to black 0 candidates is outweighed by the disadvantage to black 8 candidates. 
Given the current donation rates, the 0 rule probably decreases the percentage of kidneys trans-
planted into black Americans. See Appendix. 
163. See note 61. 
164. See M . Aprile, J. Rochon and C. Cardella, Effect of Peak PRA 's on the Outcome of 
Cadaver Kidney Tran.fplants, 21 Transplantation Proc. 735 (1989). There is a greater likelihood 
that immunosuppressant drugs can prevent an unmatched recipient from producing antibodies. 
165. Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. at 134 (cited in note 60). 
166. Id. at 133. 
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The "near-universal sympathy for the plight" of presensitized and 
blood type 0 recipients, which gave rise to these equitable exceptions to 
the UNOS allocation system, also might be seen as an instance of effec-
tive interest group lobbying. Both these equitable exceptions respond to 
the preferences of candidates who are represented on the waiting list 
long enough to form a powerful political constituency. Indeed, the Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act explicitly mandates that allocative prefer-
ence be given to presensitized patients. u17 The strength of the 
presensitization lobby is such that UNOS turned down an application 
for a variance to deemphasize sensitization at a single transplant center. 
The OPO in question argued that because presensitized patients have 
worse medical outcomes, giving them priority wastes resources.168 Yet 
UNOS, in compliance with its federal contract, affirmatively rejected 
the survival goal to promote the equitable interests of presensitized 
candidates. As in other contexts, one person's equity is another person's 
private interest. 
B. The Relevance of Race 
The above analysis may demonstrate that our allocation systems 
are not determined solely by the goals of transplant survival or cost 
minimization, but it has not directly addressed why society should re-
spond to allocation strategies that have a disparate impact on blacks. 
This section attempts to provide such a rationale. One of the strongest 
rationales for disparate impact liability in the law is to prohibit actions 
that might be motivated by racial animus. 168 Such suspicions are, how-
ever, virtually absent in the transplantation context. All participants in 
the area believe that the original point system and its subsequent modi-
fications were developed in good faith to accommodate the goals of 
graft survival and other equitable concerns. 170 
We believe, however, that race is relevant for two reasons. First, 
ignoring the disparate impact of blacks represents selective indiffer-
ence.171 The UNOS guidelines privilege equity over efficiency when 
presensitized or blood-type 0 patients received smaller numbers of 
transplants, but are indifferent to the equitable claim of blacks. If the 
roles were reversed and white patients had lower chances of matching 
antigens, we believe that the point system might give less weight to 
167. NOTA § 372, 98 Stat. at 2344. See also Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. at 133; R. Men-
dez, A National Allocation System, 20 Transplantation Proc. 1014 (Supp. 1 1988). 
168. Dennis, American Blacks at 11 (cited in note 85). 
169. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L. J. 585 (1983). 
170. See note 61. 
171. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term- Foreword: In Defense of the Anti Dis-
crimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1976). 
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matching. Even those who believe that the best allocation should sim-
ply try to maximize survival rates, the willingness of the system to re-
spond selectively to other equitable claims might argue for considering 
the claims of blacks as well. In a world where the equitable claims of 
other discrete groups are heard, UNOS's failure to respond to the equi-
table claims of black patients becomes suspect. 
Second, responding to this disparate racial access can be justified 
as an attempt to eliminate the effects of past discrimination.173 Kidney 
failure is associated with a number of other factors that may be exacer-
bated in black communities because of past discrimination-including 
poverty, stress, alcohol use, and poor medical care. To the extent that 
past discrimination178 has left blacks disproportionately poor and that 
poverty induces higher rates of kidney failure/74 these lingering effects 
of discrimination also support society's corrective concern. At a mini-
mum, we believe it is incumbent on society not to ignore the equitable 
claims of blacks in favor of other possibly less pressing equitable claims 
such as those of presensitized or blood type 0 recipients. 
In making this case for privileging race, difficult issues of framing 
need to be addressed. For example, one might persuasively argue that 
federal funding of virtually all renal transplants represents tremendous 
governmental largess to the disproportionately black ESRD population 
and that when considered as a whole the program disproportionately 
172. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desesresation and the Corrective Ideal, 
86 Colum. L. Rev. 728 (1986). 
173. Recent research by Clarence E. Grim suggests that blacks may have higher rates of 
hypertension and kidney failure because of the quintessential expression of discrimina-
tion-slavery. "[B)Iacks living in the United States today may owe their higher hypertension rat~ 
to a genetic trait that helped their ancestors survive the grueling conditions of slavery. That trait is 
an inherited tendency to conserve salt within the body .... " Kathy A. Fackelmann, The African 
Gene?, 140 Science News 254 (1991). 
Grim's provocative hypothesis is that Africans with a salt-conserving gene or genes were less 
likely to die of dehydration during transport across the Atlantic by slavetraders. Id. at 254. The 
ability to hold onto salt-and thus water- also helped them to survive the harsh conditions they 
encountered in the New World. Seventy percent of African slaves died within the first four years of 
their capture. This devastating fatality rate might have radically accelerated the process of genetic 
selection. The same genetic ability to retain salt that may have conferred a temporary survival 
advantage on slaves may now be responsible for a higher level of hypertension and kidney failure. 
It should be stressed that while this causal hypothesis is supported by some indirect evidence, 
id., it is quite controversial. For example, even though West Africans consume a high salt diet, 
they have much lower rates of high blood pressure among American blacks. Id. at 255. Yet the 
possibility that the elevated renal failure among blacks is a vestige of the slave trade makes con-
crete the causal link between past discrimination and the current demand for renal transplanta-
tion. Even if we conclude that the theory has only a 50% chance of being true-or only explains 
50% of the elevated black demand-the mere possibility that slavery increased the kidney failure 
rate among blacks provides a conceivable rationale for restructuring allocation systems that disfa-
vor blacks. 
174. ld. at 254 (saying that "the stress of poverty or racism may evoke a hormonal 'fight or 
flight' response that boosts heart rate and blood pressure"). 
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favors blacks-even though the antigen matching aspect of the allograft 
allocation disproportionately excludes blacks. 176 Moreover, even if the 
disparate racial impact of antigen matching is a concern, blacks-and 
society-might benefit more from corrective efforts that address other 
health issues such as high blood pressure, smoking, or even prenatal 
care. 
Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that no single perspective can capture 
all of society's concerns. They speak of "the motion that is composed of 
the succession of decision, rationalization, and violence as quiet replaces 
anxiety and is replaced by it when society evades, confronts, and 
remakes the tragic choice."178 In making tragic choices, societies inevi-
tably oscillate between different perspectives. In this Article we have 
framed the issue around the ongoing debate about how to allocate ca-
daveric kidneys and have implicitly left aside the thorny issues of 
whether government should continue subsidy of kidney transplantation 
and whether attempts to remedy past discrimination are better done by 
other compensating programs. To the extent that the proper allocation 
of cadaveric kidneys remains a discrete public concern, the medically 
unjustified disparate impact on blacks is a relevant concern of 
policymakers. 
C. Proposal to Revise the UNOS Point System 
1. Accommodating Equity and Efficiency177 
This tension between equity and efficiency concerns is reflected im-
plicitly in the language of the NOTA, which requires organ procure-
ment organizations to "allocate donated organs equitably among 
transplant patients according to established medical criteria."178 We do 
not claim that a consensus exists concerning the appropriate balance 
between equity and efficiency objectives. Instead, we suggest that there 
is a spectrum of allocative systems that represent different accommoda-
tions of these conflicting objectives. 
175. This framing argument parallels the issue in Connecticut u. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
In that case the Supreme Court considered whether an employment test which disparately ex-
cluded blacks violated Title VII even though the employer had hired proportionate numbers of 
protected workers. The Court rejected the employer's "bottom line" defense and held that Title 
VII plaintiffs had discretion on how to frame their disparate impact claim. 
176. Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 19 (cited in note 24). 
177. A classic discussion of these concerns can be found in Arthur M. Okun, Equality and 
Efficiency, The Big Tradeoff (Brookings Inst., 1975). 
178. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(E) (1988 and Supp. II 1990). Originally the act mandated that 
kidneys be allocated equitably "between patients and centers." But in 1988 Congress amended the 
Act deleting the reference to transplant centers, thus further focusing the allocation issues on pa-
tient equity. 
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At one extreme is the current system, which places almost exclusive 
emphasis on antigen matching. At the other extreme would be alloca-
tion by pure waiting list. Giving cadaveric kidneys to the dialysis pa-
tients who had waited longest would ensure that persons of each race 
would receive a share of transplants proportional to that race's repre-
sentation on the waiting list. A pure waiting list achieves this equity, 
however, at the cost of reduced graft survival. By giving no weight to 
recipients who have even six antigen matches, first-come-first served al-
location systems sacrifice increased probability of graft survival for at 
least a portion of the transplanted kidneys.1711 At least in the current 
cyclosporine era of drug therapy, we ultimately reject this type of 
queueing allocation for reasons analogous to those that led us to reject 
the extreme efficiency-based allocation schemes.180 We conjecture that 
our society cares about equity, but equitable goals, like efficiency goals, 
are themselves incomplete. 
Our preferred accommodation of these competing goals of equita-
ble access and graft survival is (1) to give allocative preference to anti-
gen matching in proportion to its effectiveness in enhancing graft 
survival, and also (2) to give patients with rare antigens and who are 
therefore harder to match a preference in receiving those unmatched 
kidneys when enhanced graft survival is not at issue. This modified al-
location system would continue the mandatory sharing of six-antigen-
matched kidneys and might possibly give some preference to recipients 
with only one antigen mismatch as this degree of partial matching may 
enhance graft survival.181 Unlike the current UNOS system, however, 
recipients who mismatched two or more antigens of a donated kidney 
would receive no points. Our proposed system also would give patients 
with relatively rare antigens at least the same number of points that are 
given for other equitable concerns such as presensitization. Although 
the exact values are open to debate, Table 6 provides a redacted version 
showing how our proposal would change the current UNOS point 
system. 
179. There is an argument that pure waiting lists sacrifice equitable concerns because dissim· 
ilar people are treated similarly. Thus, among the class of white recipients, a waiting list would be 
inequitable because recipients with lower expected graft survival might be given priority in trans· 
plantation. We conjecture, however, that pure waiting lists would not be as immediately objection-
able to society as allocations that include racial exclusions. Other countries, for example, have used 
pure waiting lists to allocate kidney transplants in the past. See Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic 
Choices (cited in note 24). 
180. See Part III.A. See also 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1642 (cited in note 6) (saying that first-
come, first-served allocations "are ethically bankrupt: society would be choosing not to choose"). 
181. See text accompanying note 130. 
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TABLE 6. MODIFIED POINT SYSTEM FOR SELECTING KIDNEY TRANSPLANT 
RECIPIENTS 
(Additions are in brackets; deletions are lined out) 
HLA matching 
0 - A, B, DR mismatch 
[1 - A, B, DR mismatch 
9 B, DR mismaie'h 
9 A, B mi:smateh 
1 B, DR mismate'h 
2 B, DR mi:smate'h 
a B, DR mismateh 
Waiting Time 
Patient with longest waiting period 
(proportionate points for 
shorter periods) 
Each year on waiting list 
Children 
Age 0-5 
Age 6-10 
Presensitization 
[Rare Antigens 
Points 
l 
2 
1 
4 
4] 
[Mandatory Sharing] 
[2] 
[1] 
Patients whose combination of antigens would give them less than a ten 
percent chance of qualifying for one of the antigen matching prefer-
ences could receive "rare antigen" points. Awarding rare antigen points 
would be consonant with the equitable exceptions already in place. Just 
as the presensitization points promote medical justice by elevating the 
chances of those with medical bad luck,111 recipients with the poor for-
tune of having rare antigens would receive a preference.181 Awarding 
points for rare antigens thus would increase the ex ante equality of op-
portunity.1a. While the criterion of having less than a ten percent 
182. Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. at 133 (cited in note 60). 
183. The preference for patients with rare antigens is even more defensible than the prefer-
ence for presensitized patients because a patient's antigens are an immutable characteristic while 
presensitization often is the result of a previous transplant opportunity that failed. 
184. Before being antigen typed (ex ante), each ESRD patient theoretically could have the 
aame probability of transplantation. Typing would then reveal which recipients had non-rare anti-
gens-and hence an elevated chance of qualifying for antigen matching preference-and which 
recipients had rare antigens-and hence an elevated chance of qualifying because of the rare anti-
gen preference. 
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chance of matching five or six antigens is an arbitrary cutoff, it is no 
more arbitrary than the current criteria for presensitization-PRA 
greater than eighty percent-or childhood-less than ten years old. 
Most importantly, rare antigen points-combined with a deem-
phasis on partial matching-could substantially reduce the disparate 
racial impact of the current point system without resorting to race con-
scious points. Because black ESRD patients only rarely qualify for six-
antigen match transplants, 185 disproportionate numbers of rare antigen 
points would go to blacks. Awarding points on the basis of rare antigen 
type would also avoid problems that might accompany a race conscious 
preference. If blacks received race conscious points to remedy this dis-
parate impact and possible past discrimination, the rate of white cadav-
eric donations might decrease. In addition, race conscious points 
awarded on the basis of a patient's declaration might induce whites to 
misrepresent their race in order to qualify for these additional points.l11 
At a minimum, the current UNOS point system should be 
amended to award more points for time on the waiting list relative to 
partial antigen matching. As discussed above, 187 the current point sys-
tem uses time on the waiting list largely as a tie-breaker. The current 
practice of awarding points for as few as one or two antigen matches 
cannot be supported absent reliable evidence that recipients with two 
or three matching antigens have higher success rates than patients with 
Equalizing ex ante opportunity is not universally reflected in our discrimination law. Imagine, 
for example, that an employer needs to hire 100 people. Ninety-five of the jobs can be performed 
by any worker, but five jobs require sufficient strength so that hiring only men constitutes a bona 
fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) under Title vn. In economic parlance ex ante equal employ-
ment opportunity would mean that an applicant would have an equal opportunity of being hired 
regardless of gender. A commitment to ex ante equality of opportunity would therefore require 
employers to give women preference in competing for the remaining jobs; 50 of 95 would need to 
go to women to counterbalance the five BFOQ jobs for which women could not compete. Title VII 
imposes no such requirement upon employers to employ preferences to counterbalance BFOQ 
hiring. 
We suggest, however, that the government regulations concerning kidney transplantation 
should reflect a concern for ex ante racial equality. Employers under Title VII are not required to 
consider equity when hiring employees, and individual employers are not required to eliminate the 
vestiges of past societal discrimination. In the kidney context the government does mandate other 
forms of equitable allocations, and the possible connection between kidney failure and slavery 
heightens society's responsibility for disparate racial access to this scarce commodity. 
185. See text accompanying notes 87-90. 
186. A race-conscious allocation system, however, does have some merits. The current point 
system gives black recipients an arbitrary preference for partial antigen matching even though 
partial matching has no empirical relation to survival rates in black recipients. See text accompa-
nying notes 132-34. Moreover, giving black ESRD patients a fixed number of points could directly 
counterbalance the disparate racial impact of mandatory six antigen sharing and partial antigen 
points so that cadaveric kidneys would be allocated to blacks in proportion to black representation 
in the ESRD population. 
187. See note 64 and accompanying text. 
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zero or one matching antigen. The current system, therefore, needlessly 
sacrifices equity with minimal increase in graft survival. Eliminating 
the current points for two or more mismatches and increasing the 
points for time on the waiting list can mitigate both the disparate racial 
impact and the caprice of the current allocation rules.188 
Moreover, our proposal is consonant with the variances in place at 
several OPOs throughout the country. The Regional Organ Bank of Illi-
nois (ROBI) allocates cadaveric kidneys under a UNOS-approved vari-
ance that already employs two of our proposed changes. The ROBI 
point system gives more weight to time on the waiting list relative to 
antigen matching and gives no points for two or three B, DR mis-
matches.188 Indeed, virtually all of the alternative allocation rules put 
less emphasis on antigen matching relative to time on the waiting list. 180 
Thus, when individual transplant centers seek to vary UNOS rules they 
almost invariably move away from antigen matching toward the kind of 
allocation rules that we propose. 
2. Defining the Geographic Scope of the Point System 
Up to now, we have focused on modifying kidney allocation by 
changing the relative weight given to different factors under the UNOS 
point system. The choices involved in constructing a scheme for allocat-
ing cadaveric kidneys, however, also include the appropriate geographic 
scope of the point system. Defining the geographic scope establishes the 
pool in which the point system operates. A kidney harvested in an Ala-
bama hospital, for example, could go to the recipient who had the most 
points on that hospital's waiting list, on that OPO's waiting list, or on a 
national waiting list. The choice of the appropriate pool size is analyti-
cally distinct from the question of the appropriate bases for awarding 
points. 
Recently, advocates of increased antigen matching have proposed 
extending the geographic scope of the partial antigen matching pool.111 
Instead of the current system, which applies the point system to those 
on local waiting lists, these authors would pool recipients nationally and 
transport each kidney to the recipient who had accumulated the most 
points for that kidney based on HLA matching. A national point system 
188. Granting more points for time on the waiting list would enhance equity while retaining 
some of the benefits of antigen matching. Due to relatively poor matching, however, black ESRD 
patients would be able to overcome the racial impact of antigen matching onJy by waiting for 
longer periods. Thus, enhancing the relative importance of waiting list points would mitigate but 
not extinguish the disparate racial impact. 
189. See Lazda, 23 Transplantation Proc. 901 (cited in note 84). 
190. See Dennis, American Blacks (cited in note 85). 
191. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25). 
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is consistent with an emphasis on enhanced survival through better an-
tigen matching because the larger the pool of recipients, the greater the 
probability of finding a good match. The choice of a national system 
might also be consistent with an emphasis on equity. If a pure waiting 
list were used to allocate kidneys, it would be inequitable to apply the 
points on a local basis because under this normative view the dialysis 
patients who had waited the longest should have a prior claim to kid-
neys harvested in any part of the country. Thus, a national scope for 
the point system is supportable on both equity and efficiency rationales. 
The strongest arguments in favor of a local scope for point systems 
concern issues of procurement.113 The mode of allocating cadaveric kid-
neys may alter the number of kidneys that are harvested. The incen-
tives of the harvesting doctor may be particularly important.1es Beyond 
the often arduous task of removing organs at the time of death, which 
may often be at night, the harvesting OPO must first gain the consent 
of the donor family. Making more than perfunctory efforts to accom-
plish these tasks requires a large amount of altruism. Much of the in-
centive to procure kidneys aggressively derives from the knowledge that 
local patients will benefit. Local allocation may increase procurement 
rates by enabling centers to transplant patients on their own waiting 
list 114 and aggressive OPOs to reap rewards for their efforts. 
Conversely, mandatory sharing of all kidneys may discourage pro-
curement in an era when the donor shortage is clearly the limiting fac-
tor in renal transplantation. Expanding the scope of the UNOS point 
system to the national level would decrease the likelihood of transplant-
ing kidneys that were harvested locally. While there are no direct em-
pirical data on the magnitude of this procurement effect, it is widely 
acknowledged in the literature11& and implicit in the current UNOS 
guidelines, which require OPOs that receive a six-antigen-matched kid-
ney from another center to return the next suitable kidney with the 
192. A local allocation system provides the added benefits of lower cost and quicker trans-
plantation. National allocation, however, has been estimated to entail an increased expenditure of 
only $1000 per transplant.. ld. While national allocation causes longer delays between harvestmg 
and transplantation, better techniques and new drug therapies have reduced the importance of 
preservation time as a determinant of graft survival. 
193. See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 490 (cited in note 4). 
In light of the ... strong condemnation of commercializing organs and its advocacy that 
property rights of donors be eliminated, it is ironic that the ideology of "national resource" 
for organs confronts and must respond to the territoriality or property rights perspec-
tive-not of donors or patients, but of transplant cen ters and their surgical teams. 
I d. 
194. See Thomas E. Stanl, et al., A Multifactorial System for Equitable Selection of Ca-
daver Kidney Recipients, 257 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 3073 (1987). 
195. See id. 
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same ABO type!" In sum, because of this possible procurement ef-
fect, 187 we tentatively propose retention of local geographic allocation, 
but suggest that more empirical work is necessary. 
D. Adapting Allocation to New Drug Therapies 
The previous sections have been concerned primarily with discuss-
ing how we should allocate kidneys in the current cyclosporine era. But 
as we advance these tentative proposals, the postcyclosporine era is rap-
idly taking shape as new therapies become available. These new thera-
pies not only may increase survival rates, but also may simplify the 
normative dilemmas outlined above. If the new drugs successfully elimi-
nate recipient race and antigen matching as determinants of graft sur-
vival, allocation schemes can begin to treat time on the waiting list as 
the determinative factor.188 Under this scenario, the tradeoff between 
equity and efficiency would largely disappear. 
At the very least, the current empiricism is sufficient to suggest 
that immunosuppressant therapies should be sensitive to racial differ-
ences. There is growing evidence that black patients have heightened 
immunologic responsiveness188 and may require more intense drug ther-
apies.200 Indeed, quadruple immunosuppression, which has proven to 
abrogate racial disparity in graft survival over three years, originated 
not because of a special concern for race, but rather to alleviate 
cyclosporine toxicity. The improvement in black allograft survival was 
noted only as an ancillary benefit. Therefore, with the evidence of im-
munologic differences between races mounting, the medical community 
now must define parameters of immune responsiveness that may differ 
between races. Failing to account for potential racial differences would 
be another form of selective indifference, p&ralleling the unfortunate 
196. UNOS Policy § 3.5.11 (1992) ("Payback for Six Antigen Match Kidneys"). See also id. 
§ 3.5.12 ("Payback of Voluntarily Shared Kidneys with Extra-Renal Organs"); id. § 3.5.13 (1992) 
("Payback of Kidneys Shared for Highly Sensitized Recipients"). 
197. In reaching this conclusion, we should note that one of the authors is a nephrologist at 
the University of Alabama. Because of the high procurement rates of the Alabama Regional Organ 
and Tissue Center, a national point system-whether based on pure antigen matching or a pure 
waiting list-would inevitably reduce the number of transplants performed at the center and in-
crease the waiting time for those on the local waiting list. Consequently, readers may want to 
probe our analysis because of a possible conflict of interest. For a more detailed discussion of 
various interests of participants in the current allocation debate, see note 205 and accompanying 
text. 
198. It may be that six-antigen-matched transplants would retain significance and therefore 
should be included in the revised point system. 
199. See, for example, R. H. Kerman, eta!., Stronger Immune Responsiveness of Blacks us. 
Whites May Account for Renal Allograft Suruiual Differences, 23 Transplantation Proc. 380 
(1991). 
200. See Gaston, et al., 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83). 
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practice of extrapolating the results of white or male cohorts in other 
areas of science. 1101 
The more difficult normative question may concern the degree of 
empiricism that is required to justify a change in allocation policies. At 
a minimum, we argue that such policies should not be static, but should 
continue to evolve. The emergence of new drug therapies only under-
scores this conclusion. In the absence of authoritative empiricism, ad-
ministrative agencies should consider whether it is advantageous to wait 
for more information. 2011 While deemphasizing partial antigen matching 
may reduce survivability, retaining or expanding the current point sys-
tem will almost certainly perpetuate or worsen the racial disparity in 
transplantation. Weighing these speculative costs against certain equi-
table benefits might militate for changing the allocation rules without 
waiting for further confirming data. 
The current UNOS point system developed outside of the formal 
administrative rulemaking process and does not adequately address the 
impact of current immunotherapy. Both administrative and therapeutic 
changes militate for a revised allocation system. HHS has decided to 
formally develop and submit for comment a formal notice of proposed 
rulemaking to replace the mandatory allocation system devised by 
UNOS.1103 In the postcyclosporine era the heavy preference for partial 
matching relative to time on the waiting list is normatively untenable. 
Even if our prior understanding justified privileging partial antigen 
matching, newer empiricism indicates that those benefits are small and 
potentially decreasing, with a decidedly adverse impact on blacks. The 
current UNOS allocation system is outmoded and should be revised. 
E. A Political History of Antigen Matching and 
Immunosuppression 
These pressing allocative decisions are not being made in an eso-
teric or ahistorical setting. Indeed, we argue that the history of kidney 
transplantation has powerfully framed the normative issues that policy-
makers now confront. The transplantation community is itself sharply 
divided between those who would extend antigen matching even further 
and those who would deemphasize antigen matching in the face of su-
perior therapeutic regimens. In this section we sketch the history of re-
201. See, for example, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard, 1982). 
202. See, for example, International Harvester u. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
203. Mason Letter (cited in note 29). 
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nal transplantation and outline the current positions of the major 
players in the policy debate.2 ().4 
The first successful kidney transplant in the United States was per-
formed in 1953 by Dr. Joseph Murray at Boston's Peter Bent Brigham 
Hospital with a kidney donated by an identical twin of the recipient.2011 
The early history of transplantation was shaped by the use of living 
related donors, particularly twins, whose kidneys could be transplanted 
in the absence of immunosuppressant drugs. Until the late 1960s 
chronic dialysis treatments were not widely available, and kidney fail-
ure was a fatal disease. In those years surgeons were willing to attempt 
transplants without firm evidence of the likelihood of success because 
the alternative for the patient was almost certain death. Thus, trans-
plants from a variety of living related donors-including fraternal 
twins, siblings, and parents-were attempted. At that time the only im-
munosuppressant drugs were cortisone derivatives, which were highly 
toxic and poorly tolerated. In the absence of effective immunosuppres-
sive therapies, research focused on genetic determinants of graft sur-
vival. Initially, it was observed that some transplants from siblings were 
quickly rejected while others survived for long periods of time. In the 
early 1960s Jean Dausset and others discovered HLA antigens and de-
veloped the techniques of tissue typing. The discovery of the antigen 
loci and the ability to identify different antigen types furthered the ge-
netic emphasis in kidney transplantation. Tissue typing for antigens 
among potential living donors became the accepted method for choos-
ing donors, and results of tissue typing studies predicted transplant 
outcomes with a fair degree of reliability. 
This emphasis on genetics and antigen matching, which continues 
to this day, is in some ways an historical artifact of the early days of 
kidney transplantation. In contrast, liver and heart transplantation de-
veloped a radically different therapeutic ethos. Transplantation from 
living related donors obviously is infeasible for hearts and livers. In ad-
dition, short preservation times for these organs when obtained from 
cadaveric donors did not allow doctors to use tissue typing results in 
the selection of recipients.2011 Thus, transplantation of these organs did 
not evolve along the same genetics-oriented route, and thus far tissue 
typing plays a very minor role. 
204. For a more detailed history of the politics of transplantation, see Dennis, 6 Transplanta-
tion Rev. 130 (cited in note 60). 
205. See James B. Nelson, Human Medicine Developments in the Law (Augsburg, 1984); 103 
Harv. L. Rev. at 1614 (cited in note 6). 
206. Hearts and livers, until quite recently, required transplantation within six to eight hours 
of harvest. Kidneys, by comparison, may be preserved for 36 to 48 hours. 
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The introduction of cyclosporine in 1984 revolutionized transplan-
tation, markedly improving results in renal transplantation, and for the 
first time making heart and liver transplants practical. 1107 Since the be-
ginning of the cyclosporine era, however, the kidney transplant commu-
nity has been divided about whether survival of cadaveric grafts is 
determined more by antigen matching or by immunosuppressant 
therapies. 
Dr. Paul Terasaki of the U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, a pio-
neer in the development of tissue typing, has been particularly effective 
in championing allocation based on antigen matching.208 As noted ear-
lier, he and his associates have called for expanded emphasis on match-
ing-most recently advocating mandatory national allocation of 
cadaveric kidneys on the basis of hierarchical antigen matching in order 
to maximize transplant survival rates.aoe Others, with supportive data, 
have opposed such a system. Philip Held and co-authors, using data 
from the United States Renal Data System, concluded that even with a 
seven-fold increase in the number of six-antigen matches, there would 
be only a two to three percent increase in the overall graft survival of 
all transplants. 210 These data have been disputed by Terasaki and asso-
ciates, who, using data voluntarily submitted to the U.C.L.A. Trans-
plant Registry, contend that a national allocation program that 
included partial antigen matches could increase overall five-year sur-
vival rates by five percent.111 Such proponents of mandatory antigen 
matching programs usually downplay any relationship between antigen 
matching and racial access to transplantation.211 They argue that the 
point system provides more transplants for patients with longer waits 
than would a center-driven system, under which individuals have dis-
cretion to exclude blacks from waiting lists. This in no way supports the 
207. See Organ Transplantation: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 177, 179 (1983) (statement of Nancy L. Ascher, transplant 
surgeon); Barry D. Kahan, The Impact of Cyclosporine on the Practice of Renal Transplantation, 
21 Transplantation Proc. 63 (1989). 
208. See Terasaki, Takemoto, and Mickey, 3 Clinical T ransplantation 301 (cited in note 58). 
209. Gjertson, et al., 32-4 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25). 
210. See Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28). 
211. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J . Med. 1032 (cited in note 25). 
212. For example, as one article states 
Some contend that HLA matching would discriminate against blacks .... [Currently) 
(p]atients forced to wait for long periods, presumably because they are difficult to match, 
receive an allowance in the form of points allocated for waiting time. When kidneys were 
allocated according to a point system rather than a center-driven system in a local two-year 
trial, transplantation in patients with longer waiting times and those with high levels of HLA 
antibodies were performed more frequently . . .. Therefore, a change to a national system will 
not suddenly decrease the number of black recipients undergoing transplantation; rather, it 
may increase it. 
Id. at 1035. 
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conclusion that a national point system would not decrease the number 
of black recipients.218 Clearly, the impact of such policies on the black 
ESRD community remains indeterminate. 
Unfortunately, while the time may be ripe administratively for a 
reconsideration of the kidney allocation program, the division between 
the two camps is, if anything, widening. Tissue typers continue to de-
mand broader application of antigen matching and are involved in re-
search to define more precisely the genetic origins of HLA antigens. 214 
Many clinicians remain committed to retaining local control of har-
vested kidneys and are involved in the development of technologies 
that have the potential to minimize the impact of antigen matching. 
Neither side appears to be listening to the other.218 
IV. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF A DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGE 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in 
any program or activity that receives federal funds.218 In Guardians As-
sociation v. Civil Service Commission,217 the Supreme Court clarified 
the availability of relief under Title VI for persons injured by federally 
funded programs administered in a way that adversely impacts particu-
lar racial groups. The Court held, in a divided opinion,218 that although 
Title VI is directed at intentional discrimination, suits seeking to re-
cover for racially disparate impacts may be pursued under implement-
ing agency regulations, at least against governmental defendants.2111 
Thus, blacks who suffer disproportionately in terms of access to cadav-
eric kidneys under the present UNOS allocation system220 would have 
213. Moreover, the authors admit forthrightly: "Whether or not survival of the graft in every 
patient improves with hierarchical matching remains in question." Id. at 1035. 
214. Aida A. Barbetti, et al., HLA Serologic Epitopes, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical 
Transplants 1989 477 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1989). 
215. A. R Hull, Editorial, 5 Nephrology News and Issues 42 (1991). 
216. The pertinent statutory language is as follows: "No person in the United States shall, on 
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). 
217. 463 u.s. 582 (1983). 
218. Two justices concluded that Title VI prohibits behavior that has a racially discrimina-
tory effect; three others joined with them to form the majority holding that the implementing 
regulations, which explicitly mention discriminatory impact, authorize suits based on racially dis-
parate impacts. 
219. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591. See also Alexander u. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) 
(saying that Guardians held that "actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities 
could be redressed through agency regulations"). 
220. Persons in this category, as the intended. beneficiaries of the government's ESRD pro-
gram, clearly would have standing to challenge policies with racially discriminatory impact$. In 
Guardians the Supreme Court definitively recognized that an implied private cause of action exists 
under Title VI and its regulations. 463 U.S. at 607. 
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to surmount two legal barriers to obtain relief under the civil rights 
laws. First, they must show that the system adversely affects black kid-
ney patients in violation of applicable regulations and without adequate 
justification. Second, they must show either that the entity responsible 
for the policies that produce this disparate impact is subject to suit 
under the civil rights enforcement regime or that the agency responsible 
for the funding of the organ sharing program, HHS, has not fulfilled its 
duty to enforce Title VI. 
A. Disparate Impact of Kidney Allocation and Title VI Relief 
After the Guardians decision authorized recovery in disparate im-
pact cases under regulations issued pursuant to Title VI, the lower fed-
eral courts set about the task of deciding what a plaintiff must establish 
to recover.221 These courts found an obvious model in the Title VII em-
ployment discrimination cases, 221 which long had recognized that a 
plaintiff may recover by demonstrating that a facially neutral policy ad-
versely affects a protected group.223 As in the Title VII context, a plain-
tiff alleging violation of Title VI regulations makes a prima facie case 
by showing a preponderance of evidence that the challenged policy, 
though neutral on its face, has a racially disproportionate effect. 224 If 
the plaintiff successfully makes that showing, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to justify its policy.126 Even in the face of a legitimate justifi-
221. See, for example, Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
California school's policy that placed students in remedial programs on the basis of IQ test results 
violated Title VI regulations because it had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race). The 
Larry P. court used the regulations promulgated by the Department of Education implementing 
Title VI as the source of the right to recover. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1992). In programs 
receiving federal assistance through the Department of Education, this section explicitly prohibits 
use of: 
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individu-
als of a particular race, color, or national origin. 
Id. This nondiscrimination policy is repeated verbatim in 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1991) as to pro-
grams receiving federal assistance through HHS. 
222. See Georgie. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 
(11th Cir. 1985) (stating that the "elements of a disparate impact claim may be gleaned by refer-
ence to cases decided under Title VII"). 
223. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that plaintiffs may recover 
under Title VII by showing that facially neutral practices disproportionately disadvantage mem-
bers of protected groups). 
224. Georgie. State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417. 
225. The defendant must prove "a substantial legitimate justification for its practice." ld. 
See also Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982. In two pre-Guardians cases, the Second and Third Circuits 
departed from the Title VII disparate impact model as to defendants' burden, holding that de-
fendants need only articulate, rather than prove, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
policy that has a racially disproportionate impact. See NAACP v. Medical Center, 657 F.2d 1322, 
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cation, a plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating the existence of an al-
ternative policy that would be equally effective yet would avoid the 
c:l.isproportionately adverse impact on the racial minority.228 
Applying this model to the UNOS kidney allocation guidelines de-
acribed above indicates that a Title VI regulatory violation may exist. 
First, HHS has promulgated regulations implementing Title VI that ex-
plicitly forbid recipients of federal funds to use "criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race. "227 This language is identical to regu-
lations issued by the Department of Education, which federal courts 
have found to give rise to disparate impact claims under Guardians. 218 
ince HHS's own regulations prohibit policies that produce a racially 
disparate impact, black ESRD patients can make a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that the UNOS point system, with its emphasis on tissue 
typing, results in more cadaveric kidneys being matched with white re-
1333 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan u. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1980). This model corresponds to 
the traditional Title VII disparate treatment model, which then requires plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 n.lO; John· 
on v Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1981). For a description of the burden of proof 
~c:heme for disparate treatment cases, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs u. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 252-56 (1981). See generally Ivan E. Bodensteiner and Rosalie Berger Levinson, State and 
Local Government Ciuil Rights Liability § 8:25 (Callaghan, 1987). 
The courts adhering to the position that the defendant carries the burden of proof on rebuttal 
were in sync with the disparate impact cases brought under Title VII prior to 1989. In that year, 
however, the Supreme Court modified the Title VII disparate impact proof model in Wards Coue 
Packing Co., Inc. u. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Wards Coue held that statistics which simply 
compare the racial compositions of skilled and unskilled labor forces in a company do not consti-
tute a prima facie disparate impact case. The Court went on to discuss the defendant's duty when 
rebutting a properly supported prima facie case: 
In this phase, the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justifica-
tion for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the dispa-
rate-impact plaintiff .... "(T]he ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a 
protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff 
at all times." This rule conforms ... to the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or 
practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration. 
ld. at 659-60, quoting Watson u. Fort Worth Bank & Trust , 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988). In November 
1991 President Bush signed into law a new Civil Rights bill that, among other things, overruled the 
Wards Coue decision and restored the defendant's higher burden on rebuttal in Title VII cases. 
The impact of these developments on Title VI cases is unclear, although they signal generally that 
the Supreme Court's view of civil rights claims is more restrictive than that of Congress. In any 
event, because defenders of the UNOS point system can both articulate and substantiate perceived 
benefits of antigen-based matching, it will be necessary to move to the next phase and consider 
whether our proposal provides an equally effective alternative with less discriminatory impact. 
226. Wards Coue, 490 U.S. at 660. See also Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982. 
227. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1991). 
228. See, for example, Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417; Larry P., 793 F.2d at 981-
82. 
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cipients and thus has a substantial adverse effect on them because of 
their race. 229 
In the Title VII context, the Supreme Court has noted that statis-
tics can establish that discrimination is the "standard operating proce-
dure-the regular rather than the unusual practice."180 Thus, statistics 
showing that an adverse impact is not explainable by chance are sub-
stantial enough to establish a prima facie case. 211 The data we present 
here undoubtedly would satisfy the requirement to show a substantial 
disproportionate impact on black kidney patients. The statistics indi-
cate that black patients receive cadaveric kidneys at a much lower rate 
than whites, a problem especially severe in light of the disproportion-
ately high number of black ESRD patients.:m In the context of employ-
ment discrimination some courts have required that a prima facie case 
show that a challenged hiring criterion results in a selection rate for the 
protected group that is less than four-fifths that of the group most 
often hired.288 As we explained above, the UNOS system of privileging 
antigen matching in allocating cadaveric kidneys has an effect that is 
far more statistically significant. First, the statistics showing the rela-
tive rates of distribution indicate that black dialysis patients have only 
a fifty-five percent likelihood of receiving a cadaveric kidney as com-
pared to whites, a number well below the eighty percent benchmark 
used in Title VII cases. 214 Second, the current allocation system has re-
sulted in waiting periods almost twice as long for black recipients.2311 
To say that black potential kidney recipients would easily establish 
a prima facie case under Title VI disparate impact regulations, how-
ever, is simply to come to the most difficult issue: whether the perceived 
benefits of tissue typing justify this disparate impact on blacks. Defend-
ers of the UNOS point system undoubtedly would counter the statisti-
229. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 11. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977). 
230. See Teamsters 11. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). 
231. See Castaneda 11. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977) (saying that if the observed 
selection rate is greater than two or three standard deviations from the expected selection rate, 
then a statistically significant disparity is present). See also Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.14. 
232. See note 13 and accompanying text. 
233. See, for example, Fudge 11. City of Pro11idence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 658-59 n.10 (1st 
Cir. 1985); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality 11. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 356-57 (8th Cir. 
1980). This standard was taken from the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1991). 
234. Held, et al., 148 Arch. Intern. Med. at 2596 (cited in note 68). Statistics compiled in 
other studies are even more striking. See Kjellstrand, 148 Arch. Intern Med. 1305 (cited in note 
67). See also note 13 (analyzing national distribution rates among black and white kidney recipi-
ents in 1988 and finding that whites were 78% more likely to receive a kidney that year). 
235. As previously noted, the 1990 figures indicate that blacks wait an average of 13.9 
months for their first cadaveric kidney transplant as compared to an average wait of 7.6 months 
for white kidney patients. Office of Inspector General, Distribution of Organs for Transplantation 
at 8 (cited in note 11). 
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cal prima facie case by pointing to evidence186 that allocating kidneys 
by antigen matching produces better results.187 As noted above, this ar-
gument in favor of tissue typing may be correct with respect to six-
antigen matches.188 Improvements in immunosuppression, however, 
seem to have eliminated whatever tenuous survival benefits partial anti-
en matching may have had in the past.288 Accordingly, the traditional 
justification for antigen matching may be obsolete as to kidneys distrib-
uted with fewer than six antigen matches.240 
Even assuming that defenders of the UNOS point system might 
justify the statistical disparity by pointing to success with six-antigen 
matches and the marginal increase in survival rates for white patients 
v.;tb partial matching, the Title VI recovery scheme still contemplates 
that plaintiffs can win by demonstrating the existence of nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives that effectively and efficiently serve the goals that 
the challenged policy was designed to achieve. 241 The allocation scheme 
proposed in Part III would do just that. The allocation scheme pro-
motes equity by awarding rare antigen points and by deemphasizing 
partial antigen matching, for which there is scant documented benefit, 
while preserving the benefits of six-antigen matching. Awarding pa-
236. The Court in Wards Cove described the defendant's rebuttal phase in the Title VII 
context as one in which: 
the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legiti· 
mate employment goals of the employer .... The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned 
review of the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice. A mere insubstan-
tial justification in this regard will not suffice, because such a low standard of review would 
permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employ-
ment practices. At the same time, though, there is no requirement that the challenged prac-
uce be "essential" or " indispensable" to the employer's business for it to pass muster .... 
490 U.S. at 659. The new Civil Rights Act requires defendants to "demonstrate that the challenged 
pnctice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Civil 
R&&hts Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074. 
237. As we describe in Part Ill above, "better results" might be measured in a number of 
ys, including length of graft survival, length of half-life of transplanted kidneys, or even overall 
t·effectiveness. 
238. See Terasak.i, Takemoto and Mickey, 3 Clinical Transplantation 301 (cited in note 58). 
239. Gaston, 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83). 
240. Of course, if ongoing research lends support to the notion that partial antigen matching 
reases graft survival rates for whites, an argument might be made that the point system is 
ified because overall transplants will enjoy higher success rates. But as we demonstrate above, 
auccess" of the ESRD transplant program is not measured solely in terms of graft survival; in-
cUed, if it were, then whites would be entitled to be first in line for all partially matched kidneys, a 
result unpalatable to most members of the transplant community. 
241. See, for eumple, Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417 (saying that the "plaintiff 
~n may ultimately prevail by profering [sic] an equally effective alternative practice which re· 
ts in less racial disproportionality or proof that the legitimate practices are a pretext for dis-
cnmination"). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 98 Stat. at 1074 (saying that plaintiff may 
demonstrate the existence of an alternative employment practice in accordance with pre-Wards 
Coc:e standards). 
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tients with rare antigens enough points to compensate for the six-anti-
gen matching preference also promotes ex ante equal opportunity 
without reducing the expected success. 
Defenders of the UNOS point system might argue that even this 
deemphasis of partial antigen matching could result in an overall, albeit 
slight, decrease in graft survival. Yet as discussed above, graft survival 
is not the only goal of the ESRD transplant program, even under cur-
rent policies.241 Because Congress has mandated that any point system 
will involve an accommodation between the competing norms of equity 
and efficiency, a court might find that this modified point system serves 
the statutory goals as well as, if not better than, the present system.243 
B. Enforcement 
The drafters of Title VI charged the federal agencies that control 
expenditures with enforcing the nondiscrimination policy envisaged by 
the statute. 244 The statute explicitly authorizes rescission of federal 
funding as the primary sanction to induce compliance.1411 Private indi-
242. See notes 160-65 and accompanying text. The dual nature of the program goals is evi-
dent even in the text of the statute, which requires that the OPTN develop an allocation system 
that is "equitable" in accordance with "established medical criteria." 42 U.S.C. § 274 (1988 and 
Supp. II 1990). 
243. An alternative allocation scheme might compensate for the disparate racial impact of 
matching or the lingering effect of past disparate treatment by awarding blacks race-conscious 
points. Such a scheme might itself be vulnerable to statutory or constitutional challenge for dis-
criminating on the basis of race. Since the Supreme Court held in Regents of the Uniu. of Cal. u. 
&kke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that an affirmative action program must be struck down under Title 
VI if it violates the Equal Protection Clause, lower courts have upheld voluntary programs against 
Equal Protection and Title VI challenges. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n u. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th 
Cir. 1979). In Metro Broadcastmg, Inc. u. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Supreme Court estab-
lished that benign race conscious remedial schemes established by Congress will be upheld as long 
as "they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives." ld. at 565. Given that Congress directed UNOS 
to develop a point system that allocates cadaveric kidneys equitably according to established medi-
cal criteria, use of race-conscious points arguably serves the important, articulated goal of equita-
ble distribution and would survive constitutional scrutiny. 
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1988). 
245. The relevant statutory language reads: 
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the 
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to 
any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity 
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal 
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to 
whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro-
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other 
means authorized by law .... 
ld. In 1988 Congress overrode a presidential veto and passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act, 
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which makes clear that the provisions of Title VI are 
enforceable against funded entities as a whole if any part of the entity receives federal assistance. 
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viduals who wish to challenge the Title VI compliance of private enti-
ties receiving federal funds thus have two potential targets: the private 
entity itself2~6 and the federal agency responsible for its funding. 247 
Black potential kidney recipients who are denied access to kidneys 
under the UNOS point system1148 could sue HHS, which controls the 
funding of the organ transplantation network program run by UNOs.ue 
A second option would be to sue UNOS directly, as the recipient of 
federal funding.uo In response to concerns about the unchecked admin-
istrative power granted UNOS under the OPTN contract, Congress 
passed legislation requiring UNOS policies to be developed as federal 
regulations in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.u1 In 
response to this mandate, the Health Resources and Services Adminis-
tration ("HRSA"), the federal agency charged with overseeing the 
UNOS contract, is now in the process of codifying UNOS policies.1112 
Because this administrative structure now allows for public comment 
246. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582. 
247. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986) 
timpliedly recognizing a private right of action against Civil Aeronautics Board regarding its fail-
ure to enforce the Handicapped Act). 
248. To sue a federal agency, of course, the plaintiffs must comply with constitutional stand-
ing norms-that is, they must show that they have been injured in fact by the agency nonaction 
and that the harm to them would be redressed by the remedy sought in the case. See, for example, 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
249. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme Court confirmed 
the existence of private rights of action under the civil rights statutes (there, Title IX). Recent 
decisions of lower courts have purported to cut back on the permissible scope of private enforce-
ment actions in suits against federal agencies. In Women'1 Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 
F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the circuit court for the District of Columbia held that private plaintiffs 
could not maintain a Title VI suit against the federal government in which they sought "across-
the-board continuing federal court supervision of the process by which the agencies ensure compli-
ance with the antidiscrimination mandates" with regard to school desegregation efforts. ld. at 748. 
The Cavazos court was careful to distinguish that case from "situation-specific suits against the 
federal agency based on federal funding of a particular project or district." ld. at 749. A lawsuit 
against HHS cha!Jenging the UNOS point system under Title VI categories would fall under the 
latter cat~gory and presumably would be permissible even in the District of Columbia Circuit after 
Cavazos. But see Washington Legal Foundation v. Alexander, 778 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1991) (say-
ing that white students may not sue the Department of Education for failing to implement policies 
forbidding race-based scholarships under Title VI). 
250. Indeed, UNOS has a statutorily created monopoly on the organ distribution market; it 
is the only entity that controls cadaveric kidney distribution, and it uses federal funds to do so. 
Some language in the Guardians opinion may prove problematic in pursuing this course, however. 
Justice Stevens expressed the view that an action to enforce Title VI regulations would have to be 
brought under Section 1983, which of course has a state action requirement. Because UNOS can-
not be characterized as a "state actor," Section 1983 relief would not be available. Justice Stevens's 
tatement, however, was at best dicta, given that the Guardians defendant was a state actor; more-
over, lower courts have not required that Section 1983 be used as the enforcement vehicle in Title 
VI regulatory disparate impact cases. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 983. 
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(c) (1988 and Supp. II 1990). 
252. Aronoss Conversation (cited in note 30) 
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about how kidneys are allocated, aggrieved parties may influence alloca-
tion policies by participating in the administrative process. Given the 
nature of ongoing research, it is important that allocation policies be 
systematically and routinely reevaluated in light of emerging therapeu-
tic technologies. The Administrative Procedure Act's procedural model 
might be the best vehicle for assessing the adequacy of these evolving 
systems in achieving the proper accommodation of equity and 
efficiency. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The severe and growing shortage of transplantable kidneys necessi-
tates "tragic" allocative choices regarding the competing social objec-
tives of graft survival, graft procurement, and equity. This Article has 
presented a series of stylized facts related to the disparate racial impact 
of antigen matching. Because blacks and whites have different distribu-
tions of antigens and because blacks have almost four times the rate of 
kidney failure, allocation schemes based on antigen matching make it 
more difficult for black patients to qualify for transplantation. Under 
the current UNOS point system, blacks receive a disproportionately 
small percentage of cadaveric transplants and have to wait almost twice 
as long as whites for transplantation. In short, a white dialysis patient 
may have a fifty percent higher chance of receiving a transplant in any 
given year. Some contend that this problem could be solved merely by 
increasing organ donations by blacks. While efforts in this regard are 
desirable, it is implausible to believe that black donation rates for both 
cadaveric and living-related kidneys can be increased five fold in order 
to eliminate the disparate impact of antigen matching rules. Antigen 
matching is a "but for" cause of blacks' unequal access to renal 
transplantation. 
The disparate racial impact of the current antigen matching rules 
is not justified by offsetting medical benefits. The benefits of partial 
antigen matching are small and declining. Although in the current 
cyclosporine era white recipients do have enhanced survival rates of up 
to ten percent in the first year for six-antigen-matched kidneys, no per-
suasive evidence exists that partial antigen matching enhances trans-
plant survival-especially for recipients who match fewer than four 
HLA antigens. Moreover, the use of new immunosuppressant therapies 
further reduces the impact of antigen matching on graft survival. The 
current emphasis on partial antigen matching relative to time on the 
waiting list sacrifices equitable access to transplantation without any 
corresponding medical benefit. 
These stylized facts suggest that the current federal system of allo-
cating cadaveric kidneys has become capricious and outmoded. We have 
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proposed allocation rules that (1) eliminate points for patients with two 
or more mismatched antigens, (2) increase the points for time on the 
waiting list, and (3) award points for patients with rare antigens.:1118 
While the exact point values might be debated, our proposal gives pref-
erence to antigen matching that demonstrably increases graft survival 
while promoting ex ante equal opportunity for transplantation. At a 
minimum, new HHS guidelines should award more points for time on 
the waiting list relative to partial antigen matching. The extreme pref-
erence for partial antigen matching is not justified by current empiri-
cism. The time has come to reevaluate the system's responsiveness to 
evolving medical technologies to promote more equitable access to 
transplantation. 
253. See notes 181-88 and acoompanying text. 
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF THE 0 RULE 
As described above,2114 the UNOS 0 rule mandates that blood type 
0 kidneys may be transplanted only into blood type 0 recipients. This 
rule favors blood type 0 recipients over blood type A and B recipients. 
Because the blood type A population is disproportionately white and 
the blood type B population is disproportionately black, it is initially 
unclear whether the reallocation of cadaveric kidneys toward blood type 
0 patients decreases the total number of kidneys going to black 
patients. 
Using stylized facts about the different racial distribution of blood 
types21111 and the disparate racial rates of donation and kidney failure, it 
is possible to analyze a differential equation model to predict the likely 
effect of the 0 rule on the composition and size of the waiting list. Let 
R = a constant rate at which ESRD patients sign on to the waiting list. 
Combining the facts that thirty-four percent of the recipient group is 
black, forty-nine percent of blacks are blood type 0, and forty-five per-
cent of whites are blood type 0, we can derive the rates at which blood 
type 0 patients join the waiting list: 
R0 = rate of new blood type 0 recipients 
= [.45(1-.34) + (.49)(.34)]R - .46R. 
Similarly, we can derive: 
RA - [.40(1-.34) + (.27)(.34)]R - .36R 
RB - [.11(1-.34) + (.2 )(.34)]R - .14R 
RAB - .04R. 
Let N = the constant rate at which kidneys are being donated. Because 
eight percent of donors are black, the rates at which specific blood 
types are being donated can be calculated in an analogous fashion: 
N0 = .45 N; NA = .39N; N8 = .12N; and NAB = .04N. 
Finally, let G = the rate at which the waiting list is growing [R = 
N +G), then a differential equation describing the rate at which the 
number of 0-type people on the waiting list changes equals: 
dO 
- = R0-N0 =.46 R-.45N=(.01 + .46G)N dt 
254. See note 73 and accompanying text. 
255. See text and Table 2 accompanying note 71. 
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which can be solved in terms of an initial position 0 0 : 
O(t) = 0 0 + (.01 + .46G)Nt 
Analogous solutions for the other blood types yield: 
A(t) = A 0 + ( -.03+ .36G)Nt 
B(t)=B0 +(.02+ .14G)Nt 
AB(t) =ABO+ (.04G)Nt 
863 
For the special case in which the donation rate matches the ESRD rate 
(G=O), these solutions clearly reveal that blacks are disadvantaged by 
the 0 rule. Over time, more than forty-four percent of the waiting list 
would be black even though only thirty-four percent of ESRD patients 
are black. This result is because two-thirds of the waiting list would be 
comprised of blood type B patients, who are disproportionately black. 
The disproportionately white blood type A recipients are disadvantaged 
by the rule, but the donor pool is predominantly white and therefore 
provides a rich source for blood type A kidneys. 
The model predicts that the 0 rule also has a disparate effect 
against blacks when the waiting list is growing through time (G > 
0)-but that the disparate effect diminishes as the waiting list growth 
rate increases. For the past several years, the waiting list has grown at 
an annual rate of about 1200. In Setting G = 1.2, the model predicts 
that under the 0 rule thirty-eight percent of the waiting list would be 
black even though only thirty-four percent of ESRD patients are black. 
